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63 I.  OVERVIEW 
1.  Introduction 
Initially  conceived  for  intra-Community  balance-of-payments  support,  macro-financial 
assistance from the Community has been extended since  1990 to third countries,  mainly 
those of Central and Eastern Europe, but,  progressively,  also to other countries,  in  the 
former  Soviet  Union and  in the Mediterranean  area,  with a  view  to  supporting  their 
political and economic reform efforts. As they embarked on their process of  transition to a 
market economy, the countries of  this region were faced with similar problems: substantial 
costs  attached  to  the first  steps of reform,  additional  external  shocks  (the  Gulf War 
embargo,  the  collapse  of the  COMECON),  insufficient  resources  available  from  the 
lntematiottal Financial Institutions (IFis) and virtually non-existent flows from the private 
sector. 
Against  this  background,  the European Community  decided  to  extend  macro-financial 
assistance to the countries in· the region in complement to the financing  provided by the 
IFis.  It was  also  decided  that,  in  the  context of the  assistance  co-ordination  process 
agreed among the 24 industrial countries (G-24) to help the Central and Eastern.European 
Countries (CEECs), the Commission should get other donors to contribute in a similar 
way  to  support  the  economic  programmes  that  these  countries  were  implementing  in 
agreement with the IMF and World Bank. 
A number of such support operations by the EU and the G-24 took place in  1990-1994 
covering  most  central  and  eastern  European  countries  eligible  to  G-24  assistance 
(Tables 1 and 2). 
Outside  the  region  of Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  several  other  Community  loan 
operations were decided by the Council during this period.  In the context of Community 
support for Mediterranean countries adversely affected by  the Gulf conflict,  the Council 
made available to Israel an ECU 160 million soft loan in July  1991. In September 1991, a 
medium-term loan of ECU 400 million was also decided in favour of Algeria to help the 
country carry through the political and economic reforms under way1.  A further loan to 
Algeria for an amount ofup to ECU 200 million was decided in late 19942. 
Operations  in  favour  of European  Newly  Independent  States  (NIS)  have  also  been 
decided in  1994 comprising loans ofup to ECU 45 million for Moldova and of  up to ECU 
85 million for Ukraine. 
At the initiative of  the European Commission, a set of  principles was agreed among the G-
24 to serve as guidelines for the implementation of  EU/G-24 macro-financial assistance. 
These  principles  which  underline  the  exceptional  character  of this  assistance,  its 
complementarity to financing from the IFis and its macro-economic conditionality, have 
2 
Sec: Report on the implementation of macro-financial assistance to tliud countries, COM(94)229 of 7 
June 1994. 
Sec:  Report on the implementation of macro-financial assistance tu  tlmd countries,  COM(95)572 of 
27 November 1995. 2 
been subsequently endorsed by the EU Council of  Ministers of  Finance (ECOFIN) and 
are now applying to the Community's macro-financial assistance to third countries. 
2.  Macro-financial assistance in  1995 
In  1995,  focus  in  the  Community's  macro-financial  assistance  shifted  away  from  the 
Central and Eastern European group which,  as a result of a generally positive economic 
performance, is  relying less and less on external financial  support from official  sources. 
Instead, an increasing part of Community  loans were directed towards the NIS and the 
Mediterranean region. 
Within the Central and Eastern European group,  a first  tranche of ECU 15  inillion of a 
grant  to  Albania  totalling  ECU  35  million,  decided  in  December  1994,  was  actually 
disbursed in May 1995. The $econd tranche has,  however, been delayed due to slippages 
in policy implementation in  Albania.  For similar  reasons,  disbursements pertaining to a 
ECU 125 million macro-financial loan to Romania decided in  1994 were delayed and the 
actual disbursement of the first tranche of ECU 55  million took. place only in November 
1995.  In the case of Bulgaria,  serious disturbances  in'  the  economy  have  considerably 
delayed the resumption of external assistance from the international financial institutions, 
the European Union and bilateral donors.  A second tranche of ECU 40 million which is 
part of  a Community  loan of  ECU 110 million to Bulgaria and which was initially decided 
in  1992  and  reactivated  in  1994  is  expected  to be  disbursed  in  1996.  In  the  case  of 
Slovakia,  no  disbursements  were  made  during  1995  under  the  ECU  130  million  loan 
facility decided in late 1994. To the contrary, in the absence of  sufficient progress between 
the Commission and the Slovak authorities in agreeing on the economic policy conditions 
to be attached to this facility and on account of  the improving economic conditions in the 
country, the Commission has proposed to repeal the Council decision from  1994 to grant 
further macro-financial assistance to Slovakia. As regards all three Baltic states for which 
the Council had approved in  1992 macro-financial assistance, second tranches pertaining 
to the loans in favour of  Latvia and Estonia have not been disbursed, on account mainly of 
the good record of the countries' balance of pa"yments.  In August 1995  the Commission 
disbursed an ECU 25 ·million instalment on the second tranche of the Community loan in 
favour ofLithuania, on account ofthe country's good record of  progress of  reforms. 
Among the NIS (former Soviet Union), the Commission was, for Moldova, in a position 
to release the second tranche of  ECU 20 million pertaining to a ECU 45 million loan from 
1994  in  August  1995,  following  fulfilment  on  the  part  of Moldova  of the  agreed 
conditions for the release of  this tranche. With a view to ensuring a sustainable balance-of-
payments situation for Moldova also during the 1995-1996 period the international donor 
community  recognised,  in  early  1995,  the  need  to  provide  further  macro-financial 
assistance to this country.  The Council consequently decided,  in  early  1996,  to provide 
Moldova with a further loan of  up to ECU  15  million.  Belarus, which has been relatively 
late in  embarking on economic reform,  agreed a stand-by arrangement with the IMF in 
1995.  In  the  circumstances,  the  Council,  after  assessing  the  economic  and  financial 
situation of the country,  decided in April  1995  to assist Belarus with a macro-financial 
loan of up to ECU 75  million.  The Commission eventually in October set the amount of 
the loan at ECU 55  million on the basis of the country's revised financing  needs.  A first 
tranche  of this  loan  (ECU  30  million)  was  disbursed  in  December  1995.  Regarding 
Ukraine, finally,  the Commission was, after significant delays on the part of the Ukrainian 
authorities,  in  a  position  to  disburse  a  macro-financial  loan  of ECU  85  million  in 
December of 1995. In the light of the continued economic difficulties of the country and 3 
renewed efforts by the Ukrainian government to address these difficulties,  the Council . 
decided in October 1995 to provide further macro-financial assistance to Ukraine up to an 
amount of  ECU 200 million.  The first disbursements under this loan facility are expected 
for the second half of 1996. 
In the Mediterranean region,  finally,  a  second  macro-financial  loan to Algeria,  of the 
amount of  ECU 200 million, was decided by the Council in December 1994 and the first 
tranche- ofECU 100 million- was disbursed in November 1995. 
Each Community operation has continued to respond to the set of principles applying to 
this type of  assistance. In particular, Community  macro-financial assistance has supported 
efforts by recipient countries to bring about economic reforms· and  structural changes. In 
close co-ordination with the IMF and the World Bank, it has promoted policies tailored to 
the specific national needs, designed to stabilize the financial situation and set up market-
oriented economies, (macroeconomic performance and progress in reforms in beneficiary 
countries are  summarized  in  Tables  4  and  5 and  discussed  country by  country in the 
following chapters). 
3.  Trends and tendencies in macro-financial assistance 
As indicated earlier, developments in 1995 further reinforced a trend that could be seen 
already in 1994 with respect to the geographical focus of  the Community's macro-financial 
assistance.  Simultaneously,  the  increasing  diversity  in  economic· conditions  among 
beneficiaries led to increasingly diverse demands, which - in tum - have made the macro-
financial instrument, as such, evolve further.  A relevant question for the future is to what 
extent the existing instrument(s) can be adapted further to suit the goals of the Union 
while at the same time meeting the evolving needs of  beneficiary countries. 
In the  case  of the  Central  and  East European  countries,  macro-financial  support  has 
formed  part  of a  broad  effort  by  the  Union  to  establish  closer  links  with  them. 
Associ~tion  Agreements  have  been  signed . with  practically  all  these  countries.  In 
accepting,  in Copenhagen in  June  1993,  the goal of Union membership  for them,  the 
European Council  put forward  political  and  economic  measures  to promote this  end, 
among which macro-financial assistance was explicitly mentioned  as one avenue.  Since 
then,  the process of preparing the associated states of Central and  Eastern Europe for 
membership has intensified. 
During  this  process,  the  links  between  macro-economic  stabilisation  and  structural 
adjustment  have  become increasingly  clearer.  For the  IMF,  it  translated  into  a  better 
integration of such aspects into programmes negotiated with these  countries while the 
World Bank supported national authorities to design specific programmes focusing on key 
structural reforms to be supported by policy-based lending. 
For the Union  as  well,  both timing  and  content of programmes  have  been  affected. 
Community lending has become more policy-oriented while at the same time achieving 
greater synergy with grant-based instruments (mostly PHARE). 
The  countries  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  are  in  different  stages  of economic 
transformation and some of  them have clearly moved to a stage in their economic reform 
process where balance of  payments assistance may no longer be needed. The Community 
macro-financial  assistance in its original  form,  to support macro-economic stabilisation 
and the balance of payments, is still fully relevant for assisting some of them. In several 4 
other  countries  macro-financial  assistance  is  now  more  centred  on  supporting  the 
government's structural refonn. programme in combi~tion  with P~,  w~ch.  w~enever 
possible  can contribute to strengthening the capacJty of relevant national mstttutJons to 
underpin  such reforms.  In general,  these developments have also  led  to increased co-
operation between the Commission and the Bretton Woods instituti~ns. At tl:J.e same time, 
the dialogue with the authorities in the countries concerned has broadened considerably. 
While  averill  amounts  of resources  committed  have  fallen,  the  Community  macro-
financial assistance has thus tended to become geographically more targeted on associate 
countries further to the cast and south in Europe. 
The trend towards supporting· neighbouring countries further  away from the immediate 
borders  of the  Union  is  reinforced  if we  also  consiaer  the  three  European  New 
Independent  States that have received macro-financial  support from  the  Community  -
Ukraine,  Belarus  and  Moldova.  Her~ too,  focus  has  gradually  shifted  towards  more 
emphasis on  structural reform.  As in CEECs,  grant-based instruments (mainly T ACIS) 
have been relied upon in parallel to support the countries concerned. 
The  specific  examples  of Ukraine  and  Belarus,  together  with Bulgaria  and  Romania 
among the CEECs, also serve to illustrate another trend,  namely that countries that have 
either  embarked  late  on economic  reform,  like  Belarus,  or have  moved  slowly,  like 
Romania, or have lost time while hesitating or even partly reversing reforms, like Ukraine 
or Bulgaria, all find themselves in relatively difficult positions. In this respect, the macro-
financial  assistance provided by  the Community seems to have well served its  c~use by 
reinforcing the transition efforts in those countries who choose to embark on ambitious 
reform programmes. 
4.  Burden-sharing 
While  Community  macro-financial  assistance  has  been evoh·ing  towards  a  deepe~cd 
policy-oriented  approach,  resources mobilized  by  the Union in this  context have b.een 
decreasing substantially (Tables 3 and 3.1 ).  Initially,  an important feature of Community 
assistance was that very large sums of  money were to be found to support Bretton Woods 
· institutions programmes.  The Community played  a  key  role  both.  as  the largest  single 
provider ofthese funds, (mobilizing 54% oftotal balance of  payments support to Hungary 
in 1  ~90) and through its role as the co-ordinator of  bilateral assistance (the G-24 process 
for CEECs since 1991 ), which ensured a .wide participation in this effort. 
Eventually,  more resources were mobilized  by  the IFis (whose  contnbution increased 
from 21% of balance of payments support - excluding debt relief - in  1991  to some 80 
percent in 1995): a ·new lending instrument, the Systemic Transformation Facility (STF) 
was created which,  together with the increase in  the access limits,  enabled the IMF to 
increase its  assistance to CEECs and countries of the former Soviet Union.  The World 
Bank, for its part, developed successive generations of policy-based balance of payments 
operations  (Structural  Adjustment  loans  -SAL-,  followed  by  Enterpnse  and  Financial 
Sectors Adjustment loans -EFSAL3). 
3  Most EFSAL operations diseussed with beneficiary co\lntries could not be concluded by end-1995 ;md 
arc  therefore  not  included  in ·the commiuuents  recorded  in  Tables  3  and  3  .1.  \Vhen  they  are, 
contribution by the World Bank will increase according!)•. 4 
s 
In parallel, contributions by external creditors, both public and private, were mobilized in 
the fram~ork  of debt-relief and debt-reduction operations  (Alg~a. Bulgaria,  Ukraine), 
accounting for a substantial share ofbalance of payments support in 1991 and 1994. 
In this context, relative contributio.ns4 from. the European Union  and from other bilaterals 
(beyond debt relief operations) declined sharply from 54% and 25%,  respectively in 1990 
to 14% and 6%, respectively, in 1995 (or 6% and 3%, respectively, of total commitments 
including debt relief operations). 
Only the countries for which macro-financial assistance from the EU has been mobilized are covered 
by these statistics. 6 
Tabla I: COMMUNITY MACRO-FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THIRD COUNTRIES 
EXTENDED THROUGH END I~ 
Status ofcfl'ective cliabunementa u  of  Aprillll96 (in millionl ofECU) 
M11i•••  11111111&  Dlll..gf  .  DIOuud  ~llllllllllllllllllu  lladialunad 
aaduld&ctl  ~  gf:di•hunmnuJa 
IEiillo 
4,, MISEII:IIalasllllllillllla Ill ~EEC. 
Huapi'JI  170  22.02.90  610  350 ·Apr. 1990  260 
(Struclllrll adjlllllllent Joan)  260- Feb.  1991 
Cucll aad Slovak FedeniJ Republic  375  25.02.91  375  185- Mar.  1991 
(Bal-ofpaymentaloan)  190- Mu. 1992 
Haaaal'l' II  110  24.06.91  180  100-Aua. 1991 
(Bal ..  ce ofpaymentaloan)  80 - Jan. 1993 
Bulprial  290  24.06.91  290  150-Aua.  1991 
(Bal1111:0 ofpaymentaloan)  140-Mu. 1992 
Roawtla I  375  22.07.91  375  190- Jan. 1992 
(BaliiiiCCI ofpaymentaloan)  185 ·Apr. 1992 
Albaala I  70  21.09.92  70  35 - Dec.  I 992 
(Balance ofpaymenta pnt)  35- Aug.  1993 
Baltica  220  23.11.92  135  15 
(Balance ofpaymentaloena) 
of  which: 
Elton  Ia  40  20  Mu.l993  20 
Latvia  10  40  Mu.l993  40 
Uthuuia  100  75  50- Jul. 1993  25 
25- Aus. 1995 
Romaalall  80  27.11.92  10  Feb.  1993 
(Baluce ofpaymentaloen) 
Bulprlall  110  19.10.92  70  Dec. 1994  40 
(Balance of  paymentaloen) 
Romania Ill  125  20.06.94  55  Nov.  1995  70 
(Balance of  paymentaloen) 
Albania II  35  28.11.94  15  Jun.  1995  20 
(Balance ofpaymentl pnt) 
Slovakia  130  22.12.94  130 
(Balance of  payments loen) 
TOTAL A  2860  2255  605 
IL Masm:flaaasialllli1t11u latdJI[ lbi[d s:auattia 
larael (I)  117.5  22.07.91  187.5  Mu. 1992 
(Structural adjullmentaoft loen) 
Alaerlal  400  23.09.91  400  250 -Jan. I 992 
(Balance of  payments loan)  I  SO - Aua.  1994 
Moldova  45  (3.06.94  45  25- Dec  1994 
(Balance of  payment• loan)  20 • Aug.  1  r  JS 
Alseria II  200  22.12.94  100  Nov.  I~  100 
(Balance of  payments loan) 
Ukraine I  85  22.12.94  85  Dec  199S 
(Balance of  payments loan) 
Belarus  55  10.04.95  30  Dec  199S  25 
(Balance of  payment• loan) 
Ukraine II  200  23.10.95  200 
(Balance of  payment• loan) 
TOTALB  1172.5  847.5  325 
TOTALA+B  4032.5  3102.5  930 
(I)  Auilllance to larael includea a loan principal amount ofECU 160 million and arant• ofECU 27.5 million 
in tho form of  interelll rata subsidies. 7 
Table 2: EU/G-24 m.ero-finncialauiltllnce to Central and Eutern Europe aince 1991 (camalatlve amoaatl) 
Country  ALBANIA  BALTIC STATES  BULGARIA 
(Identified  (US S 237 million)  (US S 600 million)  (US S 1130 million) 
I  KIPS) 
Commitmentl  Disburs.  Commitmentl  Disburs.  Commitmentl  Disburs. 
Min  %of  %of  Min  %of  Min  %of  %of  Min  %of  Min  %of  %of  Min  %of 
US$  II•P  commit.  US$  disb.  US$  pp  commit.  uss  disb.  US$  gap  commit.  US$  disb. 
Community  123.5  52.1  71.0  100.1  88.7  300.0  50.0  57.4  184.0  54.0  533.3  47.2  58.9  487.7  70.4 
EFTA•  14.2  6.0  8.2  4.2  3.7  123.1  20.5  23.5  67.9  19.9  126.0  11.2  13.9  95.0  13.7 
United States  10.0  0.9  1.1  10.0  1.4 
Japan  36.3  15.3  20.9  8.5  7.5  100.0  16.7  19.1  88.9  26.1  228.1  20.2  25.2  100.0  14.4 
Others  8.7  0.8  1.0 
Total  174.0  73.4  100.0  112.8  100.0  S23.1  87.2  100.0  340.8  100.0  906.1  80.2  100.0  692.7  100.0 
I• of  which. A, S, SF  I  I 1.7 I  4.9 I  6.7 I  4.2 I  3.71  81 I  13.S I  15.S I  67.91  19.91  69.o I  6. I I  7.6 I  50.0 I 
Country  CSFR  HUNGARY(!)  ROMANIA 
(Identified  (US S 1000 million)  (US S  SOO million)  (US $ 14SS million) 
KIPS) 
Commitments  Disburs.  Commitments  Disburs.  Commitments  Disburs. 
Min  %of  'lo of  Min  %of  Min  %of  %of  Min  %of  Min  'lo of  %of  Min 
US$  gap  commit.  US$  disb.  US$  gap  commit.  US$  disb.  US$  II•P  commit.  US$ 
Community  soo.o  50.0  S6.4  soo.o  58.0  2SO.O  50.0  48.3  2SO.O  50.7  740.6  S0.9  68.9  660.7 
EFTA•  146.0  14.6  16.5  146.0  16.9  9S.O  19.0  18.3  95.0  19.3  162.2  11.1  IS. I  143.3 
United States  15.0  I.S  1.7  15.0  1.7  10.0  2.0  1.9  10.0  2.0 
Japan  200.0  20.0  22.S  200.0  23.2  ISO.O  30.0  29.0  m.o  2S.4  ISO.O  10.3  14.0  100.0 
Others  26.0  2.6  2.9  1.0  0.1  12.8  2.6  2.S  12.8  2.6  22.0  1.5  2.0  22.0 
Total  887.0  88.7  100.0  862.0  100.0  Sl7.8  103.6  100.0  492.8  100.0  1074.8  73.9  100.0  926.0 
J • of  which. A, S, SF  I  90.0 I  9.0 I  10. I I  90.0 I  10.4 I  sol  to.o I  9.7 I  sol  10.1 I  87.3 I  6.o I  s.t I  78.4 I 
Country  SLOVAKIA  TOTAL 
(Identified  (US$ 300 million)  (US $ S222 million) 
gaps) 
Commitments  Disburs.  Commitments  Disburs. 
Min  'lo of  'lo of  Min  %of  Min  'lo of  'lo of  Min  %4f 
US$  gap  commit.  US$  disb.  US$  gap  commit.  US$  disb. 
Community  156.0  S2.0  64.1  2603.S  49.9  60.2  2182.S  62.6 
EFTA •  27.4  9.1  11.2  693.8  13.3  16.0  SSI.4  IS.8 
United States  3S.O  0.7  0.8  3S.O  1.0 
Japan  60.0  20.0  24.7  60.0  100.0  924.4  17.7  21.4  682.4  19.6 
Others  69.S  1.3  1.6  35.8  1.0 
Total  243.4  81.1  100.0  60.0  100.0  4326.2  81.8  100.0  3487.1  100.0 
I• of  which. A, S, SF  I  16.4 I  5.S I  6.71  4os.3 I  7.8 I  9.4 I  340.5 I  9.8 I 
(I)  In 1990, the Community committed in favour of  Hungary an additional 870 MECU loan which is not taken into consideration in thi1 table 
since it took place outside the G-24 process. 
Source:  European .Commission 
%of 
disb. 
71.3 
15.5 
10.8 
2.4 
100.0 
s s I 8 
Table 3: Balance of  payments support to recipients of  EU 
macro-financial assistance by contributor, 1990-1995 (1) 
(in percent of  total commitments) 
Includjns debt relief 
1990  1991  1992 
IFI's  21  50  69 
IMF  11  37  40 
World Bank  10  13  29 
Bilaterals  79  so  31 
EU (2)  54  20  19 
Other bilaterals (3)  25  13  13 
of  which  . 
USA  0  0  0 
Japan  10  8  5 
Debt relief  0  18  0 
Paris Club  5 
London Club 
Other (4)  13 
Excludin& debt relief 
1990  1991  1992 
IFI's  21  61  69 
IMF  11  45  40 
World Bank  10  16  29 
Bilaterals  79  39  31 
EU(2)  54  24  19 
Other bilaterals (3)  25  15  13 
of  which 
USA  0  0  0 
Japan  10  9  5 
(1)  Based on Council Decisions for  EU operations. 
No operation was decided in 1993. 
(2)  EU macro-financial assistance. 
(3)  Including EU Member States. 
(4)  Syndicated commercial banks loan in favour of  Algeria in 1991, 
1994 
27 
21 
6 
73 
6 
5 
1 
2 
63 
32 
28 
2 
1994 
71 
56 
15 
29 
17 
12 
2 
6 
debt relief in favour of  Ukraine by Russia and Turkmenistan in 1994 and in  199 5. 
1995 
33 
26 
7 
67 
6 
3 
0 
3 
59 
0 
0 
59 
1995 
80 
63 
17 
20 
14 
6 
0 
6 IFI's 
IMF 
WB (policy baed) 
Bllatenll 
EU 
USA 
JlpaO 
Germany 
Other billteralt 
To till 
• 
IFI's 
lMF 
WB (poliey bucd) 
Bilaterall 
EU 
USA 
JlpaO 
Other bilaterals 
Debt relief 
Plris Club 
Syndicatldloan 
Toal 
IFI's 
lMF 
WB (policy bucd) 
Bilaterall 
EU 
USA 
Japan 
Other bilaterala 
Debt relief 
PlrisCiub 
Syndicated loan 
Totlll 
Table 3.1.: Balance of payiMRtiiUpport to reclpiellta of EU 
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5411  100  SOil  100 Table 4: Seldted eeonomlc Indicators 
1992  1993  1994  1995 
Programme  ( 1)  Estimates 
GDP at constant prices  (Percent change) 
Albania  -9.7  9.6  9.4  6.0  9.0 
Alacria  2.2  -1.8  1.1  4.3 
Belarus  -11.6  -20.0  -7.0 
Bulgaria  -7.3  -2.4  1.8  2.6 
Estonia  -19.3  -3.5  4.0  4.0 
Latvia  -35.0  -15.0  2.0  0.0 
Lithuania  -37.7  -16.2  1.5  3.0 
Moldova  -29.1  -8.7  -31.0  -3.0 
Romania  -13.6  1.3  3.9  6.9 
Slovak Republic  -7.0  -4.1  4.8  2.0  7.4 
Ukraine  -17.0  -17.1  -23.0  -10.0  -12.0 
Consumer price (end year)  (Percent change) 
Albania  236.6  30.9  15.8  10.0  6.0 
Algeria  31.7  20.5  28.0  22.0 
Belarus  1990.0  2220.0  290.0 
Bulgaria  79.4  63.8  122.0  32.9 
Estonia  942.0  36.0  42.0  28.0 
Latvia  958.0  35.0  26.0  23.0 
Lithuania  246.0  163.0  45.0  35.0 
Moldova  2198.0  837.0  116.0  10.0  24.0 
Romania  198.5  295.0  62.0  33.3 
Slovak Republic  9.1  25.0  11.7  8.0  7.2 
Ukraine  2000.0  10155.0  401.0  138.0  182.0 
Fiscal balance  (Percent of  GDP) 
Albania  -21.3  -15.9  -13.6  -14 ()  -8.4 
Algeria  -1.3  -9.2  -4.4  -1.4 
Belarus  -8.3  -1.7  -3.2 
Bulgaria  -15.0  -15.7  -6.6  -6.7 
Estonia  0.2  -0.7  0.0  0.3 
Latvia  -0.8  0.6  -4.1  -4.4 
Lithuania  0.5  -5.1  -4.2  -33.4 
Moldova  -23.4  -6.8  -9.0  -3.5  -5.5 
Romania  -4.6  -0.1  -1.0  -2.8 
Slovak Republic  -12.8  -7.6  -1.4  -3.0  0.5 
Ukraine  -30.4  -10.1  -8.2  -4.6  -5.0 13 
Table 4: Selected economic lndlcaton (continued) 
1992  1993  1994  1995 
Programme  (1)  Estimates 
Current account  (Percent of  GDP) 
Albania  -65.1  -33.4  -13.5  11.1 
Algeria  2.9  2.1  -4.3 
Belarus  -8.7  -11.4 
Bulgaria  -9.3  -7.9  -0.3 
Estonia  ·  7.6  -5.1  -9.0 
Latvia  2.3  6.7  -4.6 
Lithuania  3.4  -6.2  -4.3 
Moldova  -3.0  -9.3  -9.2 
Romania  -8.6  -5.5  -1.4 
Slovak Republic  0.4 (2)  -5.4  5.1  -2.3 
Ukraine  -3.5  -5.9  -6.0 
Official foreign exchange reserves  (Months of imports) 
(end year) 
Albania  0.7  2.2  3.3  3.3 
Algeria  2.2  2.3  2.6 
Belarus  0.3  0.3 
Bulgaria  3.5  2.4  3.2 
Estonia  4.5  4.0  3.2 
LatVia  2.0  5.6  5.5 
Lithuania  2.6  2.4  2.7 
Moldova  0.0  1,5  3.1  3.0 
Romania  0.2  0.1  4.0 
Slovak Republic  1.1  1.2  1.4  2.4 
Ukraine  0.2  2.3  4.3 
(I)  Programme targets as set in : July 93 (and revised in Aug 94) for Albania, May 94 for Algeria, 
March 95 for Moldova, May 94 for Romania, July 94 for Slovakia, April 95 for Ukraine. 
(2)  After fiscal transfers from the Czech lands, estimated at about 7% of  Slovak GDP. 
Sources: National authorities and IMF 
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TABLES 
STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
Price liberalisation 
Trade liberalisation 
Exchange regime 
Foreign direct investment 
Monetary policy 
Public finances 
Privatisation and enterprise 
restructuring 
Financial sector reform 
5.1 ALBANIA 
Most  price  controls  and  subsidies  eliminated,  with  the 
exception of bread and flour.  Electricity prices  will  soon be 
fixed by a regulatory body. 
No  quantitative  restrictions  on  imports.  Export  restrictions 
limited to scrap metals and wood. 
Free float since July  1992 within a unified exchange market. 
Early  licensing  of foreign  exchange  dealers  and  exchange 
bureaux.  Current  account  convertibility.  Agreement  on  the 
large  external  debt arrears  to  commercial  banks  reached  in 
August 1995. 
Liberal  legislation.  Liberalisation of land  sale  to  foreigners. 
Creation of  economic free zones. 
Tight monetary policy.  Use of bank-by-bank credit ceilings. 
Administrative  guidance to ensure  that interest  rates  remain 
positive in real terms. Treasury bill auctions (3, 6,  12 months). 
Tight  fiscal  policy  until  October  1995.  VAT  introduction 
delayed  until  July  1996.  Removal  of tariff exemptions,  new 
classification,  new  tariff  rates  approved  in  May  1995. 
Revenue: 24.6% ofGDP in 1995. 
96% oftotal arable•land privatized. Distribution of  temporary 
titles nearly completed in March 1996.  Laws on land market, 
mortgage,  collateral,  leasing,  subleasing,  bankruptcy.  Small 
privatisation  in  trade  and  services  completed.  Industrial 
enterprises:  privatisation  of  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises  largely  completed;  progress  with  biggest  state-
owned  enterprises.  Mass  privatisation  process.  Strategic 
enterprises  and  utilitie·  offered  for  sale to foreign  investors. 
Stock exchange. 
Two-tier banking system.  State-owned banks to be privatized 
in the course of 1996 and 1997 with majority share offered for 
sale to foreign investors. Audits completed in  1996. New law 
on the  role and responsibilities of the Bank of Albania.  New 
law  on  the  banking  system  with  streamlining  licensing 
procedures to facilitate the entry of new private banks. Several 
applicants.  Important  informal  banking  system.  End  of the 
state monopoly in the insurance sector. 1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Price liberalization 
Trade liberalization 
Exchange regime 
Foreign direct investment 
Monetary policy 
Public finances 
Privatisation and enterprise 
restructuring 
Financial sector reform 
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S.lALGERIA 
Major price liberalisation and subsidies elimination in 1994. In 
1995,  more  "sensitive"  products  (public utilities,  basic  food 
staples  etc.)  moved  closer  to  total  liberalization.  The 
Competition Law enacted in January 1995 institutionalised the 
principle  of free  pricing  while  providing  safeguards  against 
monopolist practices. 
Further  strengthening  of the  reforms  initiated  in  1994.  No 
quantitative  restrictions  on  imports  left  apart  from  a  ·few 
products for religious reasons. Import restrictions on ten basic 
commodities abolished in May 1995. 
Following  two  devaluations  in  1994;  the  foreign  exchange 
allocation system has been substantially liberalised.  In 1994, 
the Dinar was moved from a fixed peg to a managed float.  A 
full-fledged interbank foreign exchange market was established 
as of  end-December 1995. The premium on the parallel market 
has dropped considerably but remained substantial at 20% at 
end  1995.  Total  cunent account convertibility  of the  Dinar 
expected in the near future. 
A  liberal  foreign  investment  regime,  including  the  banking 
sector,  was  adopted  in  1993.  However,  apart  from  the 
hydrocarbon  sector,  no  significant  foreign  investments  have 
taken place in view of  the security situation. 
Interest rates have been liberalised and the temporary ceiling 
on the commercial banks' spread was abolished in December 
1995. Real rates, however, remained negative in 1995. The use 
of  indirect  instruments  for  monetary  management  was 
strengthened,.  Repurchase-auctions  and  a  formal  auction 
system for the sale of negotiable treasury bonds on the money 
market were established in 1995. 
The overall fiscal deficit in  1995  dropped further to 1.4% of 
GOP,  mainly  due  to  expenditure  reductions  (strict  wage 
controls  and  subsidy  reductions)  with  exchange  rate 
depreciation also contributing to the budgetary improvement. 
Hardening  of budget  constraint,  fmancial  restructuring  and 
signing of  management contracts for the 23 largest loss-making 
enterprises. Interruption of  all on-lending to autonomous public 
enterprises  from  the  Treasury.  Launching of a  restructuring 
programme for all public construction enterprises. Initiation of 
a divestiture programme for 103  small and medium enterprises 
with World Bank support.  Enactment of a  new  privatisation 
law. 
Commercial banks are almost exclusively state-owned. Signing 
of performance contracts and recapitalisation of  four public 
banks  (out  of  five)  in  1995.  Capital  adequacy·  ratio 
requirements gradually increasing. I.  Price liberalisation 
2.  Trade liberalisation 
3.  Exchange regime 
4.  Foreign direct investment 
5.  Monetary policy 
6.  Public finances 
1.6 
5.3BELARUS 
First price libcralisation in 1993. Most priees (except for state 
monopolies) freed  by end-1994-early  1995.  Phased increases 
of public utilities prices up to 80% of cost recovery levels by 
end-1995. 
In 1994 abolition of most import licences and export taxes, as 
well  as  surrender  requirements  for  exporters.  (However 
reintroduction in early 1996 of  surrender requirements). 
Early 1995 entry into force of a Customs Union with Russia. 
As a result, increase of  import taxes up to the Russian external 
tariff.  Partnership  and  Co-operation  Agreement  with  the 
European Union (not yet ratified). 
In  1994  departure  fram · Russian  rouble  zone.  Only  partial 
current  account  convertibility.  Limitations  on  inter-bank 
currency operations. Managed exchange rate (informal peg) to 
the dollar at 11500 rbVUS$ over the year 1995. 
Free  repatriation  of capital  and  profits.  Owing  to  political 
uncertainties, only minor flows of  foreign direct investment. 
Two  tier  banking  system  with  Central  Bank  conduct  of 
monetaiy  policy.  In  '1995  tightening  of  monetary  policy. 
Weekly auctions  for  a  large  share of credits  to the  banking 
sector  (60%).  Restrictive  monetary  policy  and  positive  real 
interest rates proved  successful to bring inflation down  from 
hyper-inflationary levels to below 5% per month in second half 
1995. 
Introduction of VAT in  1993.  General government budget in 
deficit in  1994  (2%)  and  1995  (2.3%).  General  government 
revenue: 48.9%ofGDP (1995). 
7.  Privatisation and .enterprise  Slow  and  delayed  privatisation  process.  Only  6%  of state 
restructuring  assets  and  12% of small firms  privatised by end  1995.  Free 
distribution of  vouchers. to the population not yet completed. 
8.  Financial sector reform  A large share of  the banking sector privately owned. Prudential 
regulations  progressively  tightened,  nummum  capital 
requirement recently increased to 2 million ECU. Banks remain 
burdened with bad loans weakening their financial position. 1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
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Trade liberalisation 
Exchange regime 
Foreign direct investment 
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Public finances 
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restructuring 
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5.4 BULGARIA 
At present some 50% of goods are subject to monitoring or 
control. Price controls still maintained on some public services 
(energy, telecommunications, water supply and transports). 
Export prohibitions have been removed. Average import tariff 
on industrial goods:  22%.  Some  import protection measures 
are still in place  .. 
Since  1991,  unified  and  quasi-free  floating  exchange  rate 
regime. Internal current account convertibility established (few 
restrictions). Limited BNB interventions in support of  the lev. 
Official (Paris Club) debt rescheduling reached in April 1994. 
This was followed by the finalization of DDSR Arrangement 
with (London Club) commercial creditors in July. 
Liberal foreign investment legislation adopted in early  1992. 
Small amounts of  foreign investment so far recorded owing to 
external  debt  problems,  policy  slippages  and  political 
uncertainty. 
Bank credit ceilings were discontinued in mid-1994.  In  1994 
monetary  and  credit  indicators  used  as  nominal  anchor. 
Limited open market operations. 
New rules on tax administration adopted in 1994. VAT entered 
into force  in April,  same year.  Revenue/GOP  ratio  in  1995: 
38%-budget deficit/GOP ratio: 6.7. 
Property  restitution  programme  well  advanced.  A ·financial 
rescue plan for enterprises was initiated in 1994 but important 
problems remain. Privatization, although having been delayed, 
is now pt:oeeeding in a more rapid pace. 
Banking  supervision  remains  weak.  Despite  an  early  bank 
consolidation  effort,' substantial  non-performing  loans  have 
been  accumulated  undermining  credibility  in  the  banking 
system necessitating tough structural action  .. 1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
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S.SESTONIA 
Major  price  liberalisation  in  1991.  By  end  1992,  virtual 
completion of  price liberalisation, including in energy sector. 
In  early  1992,  abolition  of most  import tariffs  (except  few 
luxury  goods),  and  of most  remaining  quotas  and  licensing 
requirements except for oil shale, clay, quartz.  Import subject 
to a  0.5% administrative  fee  plus  18% VAT.  Few exports 
tariffs. Free trade agreement with Baltic and Nordic countries, 
and with the European Union (as of 1.1.95). 
Current account convertibility. In  1992 departure from rouble 
zone. Since 1992, Estonian Kroon pegged to the OM, at a rate 
of  eight Kroons to one OM, under a currency board system. 
Free  repatriation  oi profits  and  proceeds  of liquidation  of 
investment by non-residents. 
Central  bank  responsible  for  operation  of currency  board 
(Issue  Department)  and,  in  exceptional cases,  for  emergency 
lending to banking system (Banking  Department,  responsible 
for  managing  reserves  in  excess  of currency  board  cover). 
Restrictive  monetary  policy  proved  successful  to  bring 
inflation down from hyper-inflationary levels to two digit levels 
(29%,  1994 year-end figures).  Central Bank does not interfere 
with the commercial banks; setting of  interest rates. 
Already in  1991,  personal income  tax and  VAT  introduced, 
turnover tax replaced by corporate income tax; social security, 
natural  resource  and  specific  excise  taxes.  Balanced general 
government budget in  1995.  General Government expenditure 
at 40% ofGDP in 1995. 
Small-scale  privatisation  virtually  completed  (about  1000 
SMEs  privatised).  Wide  distribution of vouchers,  large-scale 
privatisation  already  advanced  in  1995  (400  enterprises 
privatised by year-end, out of  500 to be privatised). 
Two-tier  banking  system.  Increased  pressure  on  state 
enterprises to restructure through hard budget constraints and 
selective  application  of the  bankruptcy  law.  Reduction  of 
number of commercial banks  from  40  to 24 through regular 
increases in minimum capital requirement following a banking 
crisis  in  Winter  92/93.  Stock  exchange  introduced.  Credit 
Institutions Act enhanced supervision and prudential regulation 
powers of  Central Bank. 19 
5.6LATVIA 
1.  Price 1iberalisation  Major  price  liberalisation  in  1991  and  1992 -including  for-
energy products.  By end-1992,  price liberalisation essentially 
completed, excluding utility prices and rents. 
2.  Trade liberalisation  All trade limitations abolished in 1992.  Free trade agreements 
with Baltic States and Nordic countries, and with the European 
Union (as of 1.1.95). 
3.  Exchange regime  In  July  1992  departure  from  rouble  zone.  Current  account 
convertibility.  Exchange rate of lats stabilised under managed 
floating system, infonnally pegged to the SDR. 
4.  Foreign direct investment  Free  repatriation  of profits  and  proceeds  of liquidation  of 
investment by non-residents. Substantial flows of foreign direct 
investment (165 million US$ in 1995). 
5.  Monetary policy  Independent  central bank.  Strict monetary  policy  resulted  in 
lowest inflation rate among Baltic States. Credit policy through 
indirect instruments. Exceptional Central Bank 6-month credit 
line to the Government in 1995. 
6.  Public finances  VAT introduced in February 1992. In 1993 introduction of  flat 
rate  income  tax  (25%)  plus  a  10%  surcharge  on  annual 
income. General government expenditure at 38% of GOP, and 
budget in deficit in 1995 (3.3%% ofGDP). 
7.  Privatisation and enterprise  Well advanced small-scale privatisation.  Privatisation agency 
restructuring  established  in  1994.  Auctions  of large  enterprises  started  in 
November  1994.  State  enterprises  not  ready  for  immediate 
privatisation transformed into stock companies, to be managed 
by a State Property Fund established in 1994. 
8.  Financial sector reform  Two-tier banking system.  49  former branches of the Bank of 
Latvia either merged  into  a  core bank (21  now  forming  the 
Universal  Bank  to  be  restructured  and  privatised  later)  or 
privatised,  except  for  one  which  was  liquidated.  Capital 
adequacy ratio increased in January  1994.  Balance sheets  of 
Universal  Bank  of  Latvia  and  of Latvian  Savings  Bank 
recently strengthened.  Nine bank licences withdrawn in  1994. 
Stock exchange already introduced. 1. 
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5. 7 LITHUANIA 
Major price liberalisation in  1991,  1992 and  1993,  including 
for most energy products.  Level of subsidisation reduced  for 
household  heating  (prices  raised  50%  in  October  1994), 
electricity (prices raised 33% in October 1994), and transport. 
Export quotas and licensing removed partially in the course of 
1992  and  completely  in  June  1993.  All  import controls  and 
licenses removed.  Since May  1994 import tariffs for a broad 
range of  goods, representing two thirds of  imports, suppressed. 
In July 1994 import tariffs on several agricultural goods raised 
to average 40%, and lowered to average 30% in October. Free 
Trade  Agreement  with  EU  entered  into  force  on  1 January 
1995. 
Current account convertibility.  Lithuania left  rouble  zone  in 
Spring 1992. Since April 1994, Litas pegged to US dollar at a 
fixed rate four litas to one dollar. 
Free  repatriation  of profits  and  proceeds  of liquidation  of 
investment by non-residents. 
Independent  central  bank  (new  central  bank  law  enacted  in 
December  1994).  In April  1994,  introduction  of a  currency 
board  arrangement,  according  to  which  the  money  in 
circulation is limited to the amount of foreign exchange held in 
the central bank. Monetary expansion moderate in  1994 (45% 
year average growth). 
The  tax  system  was  reformed  and  now  includes  personal 
income  and  profit taxes,  property tax,  natural  resource  tax, 
individual excise taxes,· as well as general sales tax. New value 
added tax replacing previous general excise tax.  State budget 
in deficit in 1995 (3.4% ofGDP). 
Substantial  progress  on  small  and  large-scale  privatisation 
through  auctions,  public  shares  subscriptions  and  voucher 
system.  By January  1995,  76% of all  companies  eligible  for 
privatisation (1/3 of state capital) privatised. Little progress on 
land  privatisation.  Autonomous  o~"'·:::.tion of state enterprises 
promotes efficiency. 
Creation  of two-tier  banking  system  established  in  1992. 
Central  Bank  and  Commercial  banking  act enacted  in  early 
1995,  tightening  prudential  rules.  International  auditing  of 
banks now compulsory. Stock exchange already introduced. In 
June  1996 new law denationalizing bankrupt Innovation Bank 
and  establishing  a  bad  loans  agency.  Foreign  banks' 
subsidiaries allowed as of  4 June 1996. 1. 
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5.8MOLDOVA 
Full liberalisation of prices  of goods  and  services  with some 
exceptions (mainly energy products). 
All export quotas removed, including those on grain and grain 
products  abolished  on  1 December  1995.  Maximum  import 
tariff lowered  to  20  % by  end  November  95,  with  a  few 
exceptions.  Excise  taxes  on  exports  to  non-CIS  countries 
introduced in late 1995, but to be suppressed before adoption 
of  the new IMF programme. 
New currency introduced in November 93.  Freely floating and· 
rather  stable  against  the  US$  in  1995.  Daily  operated  FX 
auctions  at  the  Chisinau  Inter  bank  Foreign  Currency 
Exchange.  Current account convertibility. Acceptance in June 
1995 of  IMF Article VIII. 
Liberal  regime:  free  repatriation  of profits  and  proceeds  of 
liquidation of investments within three months of the  closure. 
Agency  for  Foreign  Investment  Promotion  established  in 
January ·1995.  Partnership  and  co-operation  agreement  with 
the  EU  signed  in  November  1994.  Conference  on  foreign 
investments in Moldova held in Chisinau in September 1995 to 
attract foreign investors. 
Relying  on  credit ceilings.  Key  objective:  rapid  reduction of 
inflation,  based  on  introduction  of new  currency,  enforced 
financial discipline and enhanced central bank independence. 
VAT introduced in 1992. Tax administration improved. Strong 
VAT receipts,  including arrears.  Receipts of privatisation far 
below expectations, because of a lack of domestic capital. On 
expenditure  side,  overruns  due  to  higher-than-programmed 
spending  in  social  sphere  and  to  net  lending  by  the 
Govenunent,  owing to the assumption by the Government of 
guaranteed loans to enterprises in default. 
New  programme  for  95/96  adopted  in  March  95.  2200 
enterprises, representing about 70% of  the economy privatised 
through  the  voucher  programme,  concluded  in  November 
1995.  Privatisation for cash not successful, because of a lack 
of domestic  capital.  Liquidation proceedings  initiated  against 
20 state enterprises. 
Two-tier  banking  system  with National Bank  responsible for 
monetary  policy  and  bank  supervision.  Regulation  imposing 
provisions  for  bad loans  approved  in  1995.  Starting  from  1 
January 1996,' all banks failing to keep their reserve level at a 
minimum  of Mdl  4 million  (about  US$  900.000)  forced  to 
close or to merge into a larger bank. 1. 
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5.9ROMANIA 
The process of price liberalisation began in November  1990. 
By the middle  of 1995,  only  3% of all prices  on consumer 
goods  and  services  were  administered  (down  from  90% in 
1989).  In  the  cases  of  industrial  producer  prices  and 
procurement prices on raw materials, the share of  administered 
prices was equal to 7% and 27%, respectively. 
Full  liberalization  apart  from  a  limited  number  of 
import/export quota/bans still in force, either for health reasons 
or for  subsidised  goods.  Europe  agreement  with  the  EU  in 
force since 1 February 1995. MFN status in the US. 
Limited  current  account  convertibility.  A  market-based 
exchange  rate  regime  was  established  in  April  1994  but 
multiple exchange rates persist.  Foreign exchange is available 
to  individUals  through  private  exchange  bureaux.  The 
authorities, however,  have a history of backtracking on their 
measures  to  liberalise  the  foreign  exchange  market.  After 
dropping considerably in the middle of the year, the premium 
in the bureau de change market had risen above 20% again by 
end 1995. 
Free  legal  environment  for  equity  participation  and  profit 
repatriation by non-residents. Lack of progress with respect to 
privatization has limited the volume of  investment intlows. 
The Central Bank uses both direct and indirect instruments for 
monetary  policy  management.  Central  Bank  financing  of 
Treasury deficits has almost ceased. Weak financial discipline 
of  state companies. 
Go~ progress  with  fiscal  reform  and  introduction  of new 
taxation systems, including VAT.  Overhaul of  the income tax 
system is expected by end  1996. Fiscal deficit is relatively low 
and under control. 
Little  progress  with  medium- and  large  scale  enterprises 
privatization through the State Ownership Fund. Some success 
with small-scale privatization through  buy-outs.  Large  inter-
enterprise  arrears  hamper  financial  restructuring  of  loss 
makers  which  are  ~  source  of  considerable  quasi-fiscal 
pressure. A new atte  tpt at restructuring the most problematic 
enterprises was launcued at the end of 1995 with the support of 
the World Bank. 
In  1995,  a  reform  programme  for  the  banking  system  was 
agreed with the World Bank, a number of  prudential rules were 
adopted  and  the  interbank  clearing  system  was  reformed. 
Progress with the privatisation of state-owned banks remained 
very slow with only one bank in the process of being divested. 
In November 1995,  trading began on the Bucharest Securities 
Exchange. 1. 
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5.10 THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
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95% of  total turnover based on free prices, with regulation still 
in force  in the areas of energy,  public  tlansportation,  rents, 
telephone, telegraph and pharmaceutical products. 
Imports liberalized except for a few sensitive items subject to 
import licences. Export licensing remains for a limited number 
of products.  Free trade  agreements  with the EC,  the EFTA 
countries  and  the  Visegrad  countries.  Customs  union  with 
Czech  Republic  since  dissolution  of the  CSFR.  A  10% 
surcharge on consumer imports was introduced in March 1994 
and reduced to 7.5% inmid-1996. 
In  October  1996,  remaining  restrictions  on current  account 
convertibility lifted and clearing system with Czech Republic 
terminated.  Exchange  rate  pegged  to  a  basket  of Western 
currencies since February 1993. 
No  limits  on  equity  participation  in  enterprises  by  non-
residents,  except in the  case  of a  few  sensitive  or defence-
related sectors. Free repatriation of profits and proceeds from 
the liquidation of  investment. 
National  Bank  of  Slovakia,  established  in  January  1993, 
operates  independently  from  government.  Slovak  crown 
introduced  in February  1993.  Increasing  reliance  on indirect 
instruments of monetary control : remaining credit ceilings on 
banks abolished in January 1996. 
VAT  reformed,  excise  tax system  and  personal  income  tax 
introduced  in  January  1993.  General  government  revenues 
estimated at ~1%  ofGDP in 1995. 
First wave  of large  scale privatization completed  by Spring 
1993. Second voucher privatization scheme, launched in 1994, 
cancelled  in  mid-1995.  Current  privatization  strategy 
emphasizes traditional methods  (in particular,  direct  sales  to 
managers and employees).  Bankruptcy law came into effect in 
June 1993 but few companies have filed for bankruptcy. 
Two-tier banking system established in January  1990.  Partial 
privatization of  major financial institutions under first wave of 
large-scale privatization.  State stakes  in  State Savings  Bank, 
two largest commercial banks and largest insurance company 
to  be  sold  off in  1996.  Since  1991,  several  measures  to 
strengthen  banks'  balance-sheets.  Stricter  rules  for 
classification and provisioning of bad loans introduced in mid-
1995.  Bratislava Stock Exchange in operation since  1993  but 
financial markets remain underdeveloped. 1.  Price liberalization 
2.  Trade liberalization 
3.  Foreign exchange regime 
4.  Foreign direct investment 
5.  Monetary policy 
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5.11 UKRAINE 
Limits  on profit margins  abolished.  Reduction  in number  of 
goods for which price changes must be approved in advance. 
Increases  in  coal,  electricity,  gas,  transportation and  housing 
prices for households aiming at achieving cost recovery during 
1996. 
System  of  state  orders  abolished.  All  domestic  trade 
restrictions  abolished.  1995  budget  allocations  for  state 
procurement  of agricultural  products  limited  .to  needs  of 
budgetary organizations and at market detennined prices. 
hnport  regime  free  of quantitative  restrictions,  with  few 
exceptions primarily for health and safety reasons.  Maximum 
import tariff lowered to 30%.  Elimination of all export quotas 
and licences except for exports subject to VER.s. 
'  Abolition of official exchange rate and unification of  exchange 
rate determined  at interbank auction market.  High  degree  of 
current account convertibility reinstated. 
Decree of May 1993 grants tax relief (exemption from income 
and profit tax for 5 years) for certain investments constituting 
at least 20% of  a enterprise's charter capital. 
Allocation of all Central Bank credit to. commercial banks by 
auction.  No  more  directed  credits  issued.  Central  Bank 
refinance rate adjusted to ensure that it remains positive in real 
terms. 
Since  1992  gradual  tightening  and  rationalization  of budget 
including  reform  of  VAT,  enterprise  and  income  taxes. 
Reduction of public  expenditure  from  72% in  % of GOP  in 
1992 to some 45% in 1995. Ratio revenue/GOP: 40% in 1995. 
Mass voucher privatization  pro~ramme launched at beginning 
of 1995.  Some  1500 medium and large enterprises privatized. 
Programme will be accelerated in  1996.  Progress  with small-
scale privatization. Decision to close some 15 loss-making coal 
mines. Bankruptcy procedures simplified in 1995. 
Central bank law submitted to Parliament.  Plans to strengthen 
supervision and regulation of the banking sector.  Provisioning 
against  bad  loans  to  be  made  tax  deductible.  Auditing  in 
process.  Profit  tax  for  banks  reduced  to  40%.  Deposit 
insurance scheme to be introduced. 25 
ll.  ALBANIA 
1.  Introduction 
Supported  by  an IMF  Stand-By  Arrangement  (SBA)  and  by  complementary  financial 
assistance  from  the  EC'  (ECU  70  million)  as  well  as  from  G-24  bilateral  members, 
Albania's  macroeconomic  and  structural adjustment efforts  were  initiated  in  1992  and 
have  largely  been  successful.  Following  the· decision  by  the  IMF  to  provide  ~rther 
assistance  in  the  form  of a  3-year  (August  1993  - July  1996)  Enhanced  Structural. 
Adjustment Facility (ESAF), the Council decided on 28 November 19946 to grant Albania 
renewed macro-financial assistance up to a maximum amount ofECU 35 million, with the 
same aim of ensuring a sustainable balance of payments situation and  strengthening the 
reserve position of  t~e country. 
Albania had so far fulfilled the policy conditions attached to the present IMF ESAF when, 
in  September 1995,  the IMF  could not complete the second review under this facility, 
because of.disagreement over budgetary policies.  The ESAF is  currently not operative 
but, with the proviso that a strong financial package would be implemented immediately 
after the May 1996 general elections, ESAF discussions could resume relatively quickly. 
2\  Macroeconomic performance 
GDP growth of 9 % was achieved in 1995. Agriculture has led the recovery, responding 
favourably to price reform and privatization. However, marketable surpluses still represent 
a  small  fraction  of the  production {12-20  %)  and  marketing  channels  are  improving 
slowly.  Construction,  transport,  and  other  (private)  services  have  made  strong 
contributions to growth. Albania's industrial output has begun to recover. 
The target for the domestically-financed budget deficit had been set at 7 % of GDP for 
1995.  However, wage increases in the public sector in the second part of the year made 
this goal unattainable and the deficit instead reached 8.1% ofGDP. Starting in 1995, the 
central bank's financing of  the deficit will be strictly limited to a maximum amount of 10% 
of government  revenues  of the previous year (for  1995:  Leks 4.6 billion  or 2.8  %  of 
GDP).  Therefore,  the government and the central bank have recently taken measures to 
support the  development  of the treasury bill  market.  Six-month  and  more  recently  12 
month  treasury  ·bills  have  been  introduced,  and  the  government  has  started  the 
securitization of  its outstanding debt. 
The total fiscal  deficit,  at 13  % of GDP,  was still high in  1995.  All categories of public 
expenditure have been reduced in relation to GDP: public spending was equivalent to 33% 
of  GDP in  1995, whereas in 1991  it represented over 60 %. The structure of expenditure 
has  been  improved,  shifting  away  from  subsidies  and  social  benefits  towards  public 
investment.  Employment in the budgetary institutions has also  been sharply reduced,  by 
over one-quarter between mid-1992. and end-1994. Further reductions have been achieved 
in  1995  but failed  to offset the impact on· expenditure of a 20 % wage increase in  the 
.s  Council Decision of 28 September 1992 (92/482/EC) 
6  Council Decision of  28 November 1994 (94/773/EC) 26 
public sector. The tax base has been widened by the introduction of  personal income, land 
and property taxes. VAT implementation at a 12.5% rate was delayed until July 1996. 
As  a  result  of tight  fiscal  and  monetary  policies,  year  on  year  inflation  had  fallen 
considerably, from over 300 % in late 1992, to around 15 % by spring 1995 and to 6 % in 
December 1995.  However, wage pressures in  the public  sector stopped this downward 
trend in the first months of 1996. Unemployment is also reported to have been reduced to 
15 % of  the labour force, substantially lower than its peak of  3  6 % in early 1993. 
The exchange rate against the dollar has been stable since the autumn of 1992 and  even 
appreciated somewhat in late 1995  (94 Leks/US$ in December  1995), reflecting in part 
the international weakness of  the dollar. The renascent inflation in early 1996 put the Lek 
under pressure (104 Leks/US$ in April1996), but interest rates were raised to reverse the 
tendency.  Payments  for  current  international  transactions  are  virtually  free  from 
restrictions. 
Exports gre:w rapidly in 1993 and 1994, albeit from extr6mely low levels: in  1995, exports 
(at  US$  200  million)  corresponded  to  about  one-third  of the  value  of imports.· The 
resulting deficit was financed by foreign aid and emigrants' remittances, the latter normally 
amounting to  roughly twice the value of exports in  recent  years.  The current account 
deficit, at US$ 21  million, fell considerably in  1995. However, this was mainly due to the 
level  of remittances,  whose  sustainability  is  questionable.  Foreign  exchange  reserves 
improved (US$ 240 million or 3.8 months of imports at year-end) even though the Bank 
of Albania  had  carried  out the upfront  cost of the foreign  debt  agreement  (US$  96.4 
million). 
3.  Structural reforms 
Although most  prices have been liberalized,  price  controls remain  in  place  for  a  small 
number of  goods and services. This is the case of  flour and bread for which, respectively, 
subsidies and  price ceilings are in place. Further action will become necessary, but given 
the political sensitivity of  this matter in a pre-election context, no moves are envisaged in 
the short run.  In the case of electricity, the pricing policy is to be reassessed in the more 
global perspective of  the reform ofthe energy sector. No more subsidies are scheduled for 
electricity in the 1996 Albanian state budget. 
With  regard  to  external  debt,  Albania  reached  a  satisfactory  agreement  (fixed  price 
buyback at 20 %  and  a par bond  option) with its external commercial creditors in late 
August 1995. The upfront cost of  this agreement has been paid. 
A new system of customs tariffs entered into force on 1 July,  eliminating the exemptions 
on investment machinery, equipment, agricultural machinery and medical equipment, and 
introducing a new classification (six-digit harmonized  classification)  and  new tariff rates 
(7/25/40 percent). These changes had a limited impact on the 1995 budget revenue, owing 
to a late introduction (July) and the low rate (7'%) applied to previously exempted goods. 
Moreover,  medicines  as  well  as  imports  of materials  that  are  re-exported  have  been 
exempted from  tariffs.  A backward move  has  been  observed:  the export of all  kind  of 
wood products, except furniture and charcoal, has been banned from early 1996. 
Since  1992,  Albania has  applied  a market-determined floating  exchange rate regime.  In 
practice, current account convertibility of the Lek has been achieved,  and the authorities 
envisage progressively lifting restrictions on capital transactions.  The Bank of Albania's 27 
interventions in the foreign exchange market are guided primarily by its targets for net 
international reserves. 
With regard to fiscal  and  budgetary  reform,  VAT  implementation  (at a  single  rate of 
12.5%) was delayed  because of both technical  and  political difficulties  .. However,  the 
VAT law was amended in March 1996 and the introduction has now been fixed for 1 July 
1996. Employment in the budgetary institutions has continued to be reduced and its level 
has fallen  below the requested level  of 160,000 at end-June  1995,  against  174,000 in 
August 1994. 
Concerning the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the government decided in early 
1995  to implement a broad mass privatization programme (MPP)  for the medium  and 
large-sized enterprises.  This MPP has started and  vouchers are being distributed;  three 
rounds of auctions have already been held comprising 69 enterprises and creating 15,000 
shareholders. Moreover, over 3,000 small and medium-sized enterprises have already been 
privatized through normal auctions and the remaining few have been transferred to the 
MPP program. 
In the case of public utilities and resource-based enterprises, the Government has decided 
to give priority to sales to strategic investors. Legislation enabling the privatization of  the 
electricity  company  (KESH)  has  been  approved  by  the  Parliament.  Legislation  also 
envisages a framework for the regulatory body entitled to formulate the pricing policy for 
electricity. Privatization is starting with the electricity distribution syste.r:n,  with pilot sales 
of three regional networks.  30 % of these distribution units are sold through the mass 
privatization programme, while for the remaining 70 % the Government is preparing the 
bidding documents allowing strategic foreign investors to become shareholders.  Similar 
legislation for other sectors has been approved (mining and telecommunications sectors) 
or is under preparation (water supply sector). New investments in these sectors have been 
planned with the support of  international donors. 
A' law covering private investment funds and which sets out the legal framework for their 
establishment, licensing, operation and governance wa5 .approved in July 1995. Parliament 
adopted a law on sales of shares in October and an Albanian stock exchange came into 
operatioh in early May 1996. 
With regard to incentives for foreign investments, the creation of  free economic areas has 
been adopted and foreigners have been allowed to buy l~d  in Albania. 
Concerning the liquidation or privatization of  the 32 problematic Enterprise Restructuring 
Agency (ERA) enterprises, 5 of  these have been privatized through mass privatization. Six 
of  them are in the process of liquidation, while for the others a strategy of splitting them 
into smaller units before privatization in the MPP is being followed.  Total employment in 
ERA enterprises was in the order of 10,000 in late 1995 against 49,000 a few years ago, 
with  a  majority  of the  enterprises  ceasing  activity  and  the  remaining  ones  drastically 
reducing their workforce. 
In the key agricultural sector, the Parliament approved in August .1995 the law on a "Land 
Market"  allowing,  in  particular,  the  sale  and  purchase  of land.  Moreover,  laws  on 
mortgages, collateral, land leasing and administrative mechanisms to resolve land disputes 
were approved during 1995. With regard to the former state. farm land, land "users" have 
received the full  ownership rights, whereas, with regard to the former cooperative land, 
the right to lease,  sublease and mortgage land has been established for those who have 28 
already received  temporary certificates of land  ownership.  These temporary certificates 
have been issued covering approximately 85 % of  agricultural land.  Their distribution has 
been continuing and will  be completed shortly.  Through the Land· Market Action Plan 
supported by PHARE, the authorities have been accelerating the establishment of a land 
registry, a necessary condition for the issuing of ownership permanent titles.  Concerning 
the  agro~industrial sector, the privatization process is well under way:  2/3  of the "small 
and  medium"  state-owned  agro-enterprises  and  50  %  of the 
11large"  ones  have  been 
privatized. The remainirig  50 % of "large"  ones will be privatized later during the Mass 
Privatization Programme. 
In the financial sector, several major steps have been taken: 
- concerning  the  privatization  of the  state-owned  banks,  Parliament  adopted  on  16 
November 1995 the law on transforming the state banks into commercial companies. 
Business  plans  were  completed,  but  their  scope  was  rather  limited.  With  a  more 
ambitious  objective,  a privatization feasibility  study for  the  Rural  Commercial Bank 
(RCB) and an external independent audit on the two other state-banks were carried out. 
Moreover, privatization advisors for the Rural Commercial Bank (RCB) have recently 
been  appointed  whereas  those  for  the  National  Commercial  Bank  (NCB)  will  be 
appointed by June 1996. Based on bank external audits already completed, viable parts 
of these banks will be offered for sale to foreign strategic investors before the end of· 
1996. Negotiations are already under way for the RCB. The Savings Bank (SB) should 
be offered to private investors by July 1997. The objective is to attract foreign investors 
to take over a majority share,  whereas the remaining  state share will  be sold  on the 
domestic market.  10  % bf the banks  capit•-..1  will  be sold  in the form of privatization 
vouchers; 
- concerning  banking  regulation  and  legislation,  a system of clearance  and  a  chart  of 
accounts  are  being  prepared  in  line  with  international  standards,  with the  aim .  of 
replacing the existing system during  1997.  In February  1996, Parliament adopted the 
law  determining  the  role  and  responsibilities  of the  Bank  of Albania,  including  its 
relationship with the Government in terms of lending.  Simultaneously,  the law on the 
banking system was adopted, streamlining the licensing procedures and regulations for 
banking  activity  in  Albania  (in  particular for  co-operative banks  and  other financial 
institutions).  Since then,  several foreign and  two Albanian private banks have lodged 
requests to open subsidiaries in. Albania;  three of them have already been licensed.  A 
modem law on procedures on bankruptcy, including specific provisions for banking and 
insurance institutions, was adopted by the Parliament in Octobpr 1995.  A new law on 
insurance, atlowing private firms to operate, has ended the state monopoly in this area. 
4.  Macro-financial assistance 
On 28 November 1994, the Council of  Ministers decided to grant Albania further macro-
financial assistance up to a maximum amount ofECU 35  million in the form of a grant in 
the context of an initiative of the Group of Twenty-Four,  aiming at mobilizing a total of 
US$ 72 million .. This grant is complementary to assistance provided by the IMF under a 3-
year Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) initiated in mid-1993, with a view 
to ensuring  a  sustainable  balance  of payments  situation  and  strengthening  the  reserve 
position ofthe country. 29 
The Community grant was to be disbursed in two tranches. The disbursement of  the first 
tranche  (ECU  15  million)  was  effected  in  May  1995,  following  signature  of the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) laying  down the macroeconomic and  structural 
conditions attached to the grant. 
The approval by  the General Affairs  Council of 10-11  April  1995  of the Commission's 
report on progress in Human Rights in Albania allowed the Commission services to go 
ahead with the implementation of  the second tranche (ECU 20 million) of  this assistance. 
The  Commission  concluded  in  July  1995  that  the  Albanian  authorities  had  achieved 
satisfactory  progress  in  their  adjustment  and  reform  process  and  that  Albania, 
consequently,  was  complying  with the  conditions  attached  to  the  grant.  Nevertheless, 
owing to Albanian difficulties in reaching the 1995 budgetary targets and in agreeing new 
budgetary objectives in the pre-electoral context of 1996, the conclusion of  a ihird annual 
progra.nurie under the current ESAF had been delayed and,  as a result,  the _Commission 
decided to postpone the disbursement of  its second tranche. 
Since then, the Albanian authorities have irrevocably fixed the date for the beginning of 
VAT implementation for 1st July 1996. Moreover, further significant progress in the areas 
of reform where delays had been experienced (privatization of state-owned enterprises, 
banking sector reform,  land  ownership  certificates)  have been achieved.  These positive 
developments, in addition to Albanian assurances about corrective measures which would 
be implemented to cope with the worsening budgetary situation,  have  cleared the way 
towards the disbursement of  the grant. · 30 
ill.  ALGERIA 
1.  Introduction 
Despite  a·  favourable  track  record  of  policy  implementation  and  some  signs  of 
macroeconomic stabilization, Algeria's pace of  structural reform and the development of  a 
dynamic private sector in 1995 were seriously hindered by continuing political uncertainty 
and  security problems which negatively affected  growth,  employment  and domestic  as 
well as foreign investment projects. Thus, the development of  a political dialogue with the 
opposition is an essential prerequisite for progress in macroeconomic stabilization and for 
more decisive reform measures. 
A  major turnaround occurred in  1994, in light of a further  serious  degradation of the 
socio-economic situation of  the country. The Algerian Dinar was devalued by some 45% 
and  the  fixed  exchange  rate  regime  was. replaced  by  a  managed  float,  aiming  at  a 
stabilization· of the real effective  exchange rate.  Prices,  imports and  access  to foreign 
currency were substantially liberalized. Consumer subsi~es were gradually reduced and a 
more effective  social  safety net was put in  place.  Financial  discipline  for  state-owned 
enterprises has since been tightened and the first steps towards privatization have been 
taken. Despite diversification efforts, the country's economy is still heavily dependent on 
hydrocarbons {20% of  GDP, 60% of  fiscal revenue and 95% of exports). In this respect, 
Algeria is a "policy-taker" country, in the sense that its economic development prospects 
in the medium-term still  rely  heavily upon the development of oil  prices in the world 
market which in 1995 stabilized at a low level (approximately 15 dollars a barrel). 
The  ambitious  policy  programme  launched  during  1994  was  confirmed  by  the  new 
government which was formed  in  the aftermath of presidential  elections  in  November 
1995.  Algeria's  renewed  reform  efforts  were  supported  by  the  International  Financial 
Institutions  and  the  Community  throughout  1994  and  1995.  In  May  1994  the  IMF 
approved a one-year Stand-by arrangement of US$  1 bn.  This was followed by a three-
year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) of US$  1.8  bn in May 1995.  The first Fund review 
occurred in December and it was concluded satisfactorily, leading to a new "purchase" of 
funds by Algeria in 1996. 
In January 1995, the World Bank approved a US$ 150 million Emergency Rehabilitation 
Loan. In late 1995 the World Bank finalized a Financial Enterprise Structural Adjustment 
Loan (FESAL),  which was  actually  approved  by  the Board  in  April  1996.  The  total 
lending envisaged is US$ 400 million of  which 300 million for adjustment support and the 
rest  for  supporting  agricultural  and  housing  sectors.  Arrangements  on  external  debt 
rescheduling were also reached with both the Paris and London Clubs in 1994 and 1995, 
respectively. 
In August 1994 the Community released the remaining second tranche (MECU 150) of  its 
first macroeconomic loan in favour o{  Algeria,  decided in  1991.  In December 1994 the 
Council  adopted  the  European  Commission's  proposal  for  an  additional  MECU  200 
macro-financial assistance, to be disbursed in two tranches. 
The  conditions  attached  to  the  disbursement  of the  first  tranche  (notably  further 
liberalization of  imports, reforms in the financial sector and progress towards restructuring 
and  privatization  of  public  enterprises)  are  contained  in  the  Memorandum  of 31 
Understanding negotiated with the Algerian authorities in January  1995.  After reviewing 
the  fulfilment  of these  conditions,  the  first  tranche  (MECU  1  00}  was  disbursed  in 
November 1995. 
It was agreed with the Algerian authorities that the conditions related to the disbursement 
of the  second  tranche  would  be  negotiated  at  a  later  stage  in  a  Supplemental 
Memorandum of Understanding.  Furthermore,  agreement  has  been  reached  for. a  fast 
mobilization of existing grants under various co-operation protocols. Reinforced bilateral 
assistance is also envisaged under the Community's 1996-1998 MEDA programme. 
2.  Macro-economic performance 
Despite  some  encouraging  first  results  and  the  mobilization  of generous  ·external 
assistance, Algeria's overall economic situation in 1995  remained quite fragile,  reflecting 
·the impact  of a  number  of internal  and  external. shocks,  a  small  non-hydrocarbons 
production base,  modest job creation capacity,  growing  security problems,  a backward 
financial system and administrative resistance to reforms.  · 
In 1.995, real GOP growth is estimated at 4.3%. This result was the first positive change in 
per capita GOP in more than five years.  The increase in real GDP was driven mainly by 
strong hydrocarbon ·exports and  by  a rebound in agricultural  production following  two 
drought years.  Growth, however, remained insufficient to have a positive impact on the 
high  unemployment  rate  (25%  at  the  end  of 1995).  Despite  progressive  (but  still 
incomplete) price liberalization, the Dinar devaluation and  subsidy reduction in 1995  the 
government managed to keep the annual inflation rate below 30% through the use of a 
mix of administrative price control measures on basic commodities (which constitute the 
core of the  basket upon which  inflation  rate  is  calculated)  and  moderately restrictive 
monetary, fiscal and incomes policies. 
The fiscal  deficit  dropped further  from  4.4%  in  1994  to  1.4%  in  1995,  reflecting  the 
implementation of a number of restrictive measures  aimed  at  compressing  the  upward 
dynamics of public wages and salaries, the reduction of subsidies and transfers as well as 
the increase in fiscal and duty revenues. 
The exchange rate system is presently based upon a sort of  managed floating with limited 
Central Bank interventions in support of the Dinar,  compatible with the availability  of 
foreign currency reserves (whick at the end  of 1995  were equivalent to  1.8  months of 
imports, down from 2.6 months at the end of  the previous year).· 
The substantial devaluation of the Dinar in  1994 coupled with a floating rate mechanism 
led to a sharp reduction in the gap between the official and parallel exchange rate. In early 
1994 this gap was 250% and this contracted to around 50% as of mid-1995.  However, 
the  persistence  of this  gap  (albeit  declining)  reflects  an  imperfect  implementation  of 
current account  convertibility  announced  in  1994  and  the  continuing  use  of practices 
restricting the access to foreign currency by residents, particularly for tourism and  small 
cross  border  trade  purposes.  The  gap  also  fuels  further  devaluation  expectations, 
unrecorded (and potentially destabilizing) foreign currency dealings and capital outflows. 
Interest rates are still negative in real terms which has a depressive effect on savings and 
weakens  the  confidence  in  the  Dinar  by  .encouraging  a  shift  from  Dinar  to  dollar 
denominated accounts and holdings by residents. 32 
The overall balance of  payments situation deteriorated in 1995. During the first half of  the 
year,  a  considerable  external  shock  (due  to  adverse  exchange  rate  movements  and 
deteriorating terms of trade)  compounded  the negative  short term impact  expected  to 
result from  external liberalisation.  Faced  by  these  challenges,  the  authorities  chose  to 
adjust,  tightening  demand  management  and  increasing  the  rate  of depreciation  of the 
Algerian Dinar under the managed float, thus actually managing to achieve a small surplus 
in the trade balance (US$ 0.06 bn). However, this  was more than outweighed by a 27.7% 
increase in interest payments.  As a result,  the current account continued to deteriorate, 
showing a deficit of5.6% ofGDP for 1995 against a deficit of4.3% the previ~us year. 
On capital account, some FDI went into the hydrocarbon sector. The country has virtually 
no  access to the international  capital  market  and  despite London and  Paris Club  debt 
arrangements  leading  to  the  normalization  of relations  vis-a-vis  Western  creditors, 
virtually no new bank lending was made available to Algeria in 1995. 
Following the above-mentioned debt relief arrangements,  debt service  as  percentage of 
exports dropped from 82% in 1993 to around 49% in 1995. But servicing residual debt is 
still a heavy burden for Algeria given weak oil revenues, higher prices in the world grain 
market and declining foreign currency reserves . 
. . 
3.  Structural reforms 
Stringent  administrative  ·import  controls  and  foreign  currency  allocation  have  been 
abolished in April 1994 and were replaced by a more liberal regime comprising a system 
of  professional criteria for importers and a limited list of  prohibited imports. The latter list 
has been gradually reduced and was abolished end  1994, except for goods prohibited for 
religious and  security reasons.  The list of goods subject .to  professional  criteria is  also 
being reduced.  State monopolies on certain imports have also been eliminated. According 
to the new legislation,  access to foreign currency has been completely liberalised for all 
visible  current  account  transactions  by  private  and  public  enterprises.  Only  imports 
financed through foreign credits are still subject to authorization. 
However,  the  implementation  of these  liberalization  measures  is  imperfect  and  is 
delivering only mixed results,  given,  in  particular, the presence of a growing number of 
unlicensed,  informal traders who have  no  access  to banks'  foreign  currency.  Therefore 
they fuel informal foreign currency deals via private (tolerated) bureaux thus encouraging 
market segmentation and  a persistent gap  between official  and  parallel  exchange rates. 
Compulsory  surrender  requirements  have  been  lifted.  Residents  ~r~ allowed  to  open 
foreign currency accounts at local banks. There is no limit on the amount held and interest 
is offered at more attractive rates than for Dinar deposits. 
The legal environment for enterprises has improved considerably. A Competition Law was 
adopted in January  1995  which liberalizes the price regime  and  puts stringent limits  on 
cartels and  monopolies.  A Commercial Code,  introduced  in  1993,  has  put private  and 
public  enterprises  on an  equal  legal  footing.  The  Investment  Code  on  Joint  Ventures 
provides for full repatriation of  profits. 
The restructuring of the public  enterprise sector is  based upon two strategies,  financial 
and administrative restructuring and privatization. However, the reform process of public 
enterprises moved only slowly in 1995. 33 
In 1995, five public enterprises were granted financial autonomy and the Treasury stopped 
all on-lending to autonomous public enterprises. The authorities imposed a ceiling on the 
access to commercial bank credit for the 23  largest loss-making enterprises and initiated 
their financial  restructuring under World Bank guidance and  support.  Performance and 
"management" contracts have been signed with 7 other public enterprises in April 1995. A 
restructuring programme for all  94 public construction enterprises was also launched in 
order to  strengthen the  housing  sector with a view  to shifting  construction activity in 
housing to the private sector, while reorienting public enterprises to public works. Some 
88 local public utilities have been closed down. 
A Privatization Law was adopted in July  1995  and in August the authorities announced 
the intention to privatize over 500 public enterprises. The same legislation also restored to 
the original owners some previously  national~ed land.  A pilot programme for privatizing 
5 hotels has been launched but results have been short of initial expectation$, given that 
the present political and security situation is not conducive to private sector investments in 
Algeria,  domestic or foreign. 
As  part  of the  reform of the  banking  and  financial  system,  the  Bank  of Algeria  has 
strengthened its supervisory capacity and established more effective prudential regulations 
and controls.  The five  state-owned commercial banks have been auditeci regularly since 
1992, institutional development plans put in place and performance contracts signed.  On 
the basis of  the audits, four banks were recapitalized with a view to increase their capital 
adequacy ratio (which is expected to rise to the BIS norm of8% by 1999). Banks are now 
free  to  set their own creditor and  debtor interest rates  as  a temporary ceiling  on their 
spread was eliminated in December 1995. A new private bank was chartered in September 
1995 but private involvement in the banking sector remains extremely limited in spite of  a 
liberal investment regime.  ·  · 
4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
Following the agreement in  principle between· the  Algerian  authorities  and  the IMF in 
April  1994  and  a  request  for  further  macro-financial  assistance  from  the  Algerian 
authorities,  the  Council  endorsed the  Commission's  intention  to  release  the  remaining 
second  tranche  of the  1991  programme  and  agreed  in  principle  on additional  macro-
financial assistance for an amount of  ECU 200 million. 
The  second  tranche  of ECU  150  million  was  effectively  disbursed  in  August  and  the 
Commission proposal for an additional ECU 200 million macro-financial assistance, to be 
disbursed  in  two  tranches,  was  adopted  by  the  Council  on  22  December  19947•  A 
Memorandum of Understanding specifying the conditions related to the disbursement of 
the first  tranche of ECU  100  million  was  agreed with the Algerian authorities in  early 
1995.  The structural reform conditions relate to further liberalisation of the imports and 
exchange rate regi~es, reforms in the financial sector and progress towards restructuring 
and  privatization  of public  enterprises.  Furthermore,  the  Memorandum  emphasizes 
Community  concerns  in  the  social  sector  and  the  synergy  between  macro-financial 
assistance  and  other  Community  aid  instruments,  with  a  view  to  facilitate  the 
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implementation of economic reforms in Algeria.  After reviewing the fulfilment of these 
conditions,  the Community decided  the disbursement of the first  tranche in  November. 
1995. 
The conditions related to the release of the second tranche will be negotiated at a later 
stage in a Supplemental Memorandum of Understanding provided the IMF programme 
remains on-track. 3S 
IV.  BALTIC COUNTRIES 
1.  Introduction 
The three Baltic States,  who  recovered their  sovereignty in  August  199,1,  had  already 
initiated reforms under the past regime after the adoption by the Supreme Soviet of the 
bill on their economic independence in November 1989.  In  1992,  as  they were already 
actively  engaged  on the way  of reforms  to  a  market  economy,  economic  prospects 
worsened.  The dismantling  of trade  relations  among  former  Soviet  republics  and  the 
increase of  prices on energy imports from Russia to world levels resulted in a trade shock. 
External  accounts  deficits  were  expected  to  be  unsustainable  without  international 
support.  The three countries defined  stabilisation and  reform programmes covering the 
period mid-1992 to mid-1993  and concluded stand-by arrangements with the IMF.  G-24 
donors were called to contribute to fill the remaining expected balance of payments gap 
for the programme period, estimated at a level of  US dollar 1  OS  million for Estonia, US 
dollar 210 million for Latvia and US  dollar 285  million in the case of Lithuania.  On the 
basis of favourable prospects of support within the G-24,  the IMF board approved the 
respective stand-by arrangements in September and October 1992. 
In  November 1992, the EC Council8 approved macro-financial assistance of up to ECU 
220  million  for  the three countries  (ECU 40  million  for  Estonia,  ECU SQ  million  for 
Latvia  and  ECU  100  million  for  Latvia)  in  support  of the  countries'  programmes, 
corresponding to about SO%  of the estimated balance of payments gap.  The bulk of the 
remaining bilateral support within the G-24 group came from Japan and EFT  A countries. 
Loan agreements  and  memoranda of understanding  between the  Community  and  each 
beneficiary were signed in early 1993. The Commission disbursed the first tranche (50% 
of the  loan  amounts)  in  March  1993  for  Estonia  and  Latvia,  and  in  July  1993  for 
Lithuania. The release of  the second tranche was made subject to a positive evaluation of 
performance criteria, regarding both macroeconomic stabilisation aspects and progress of 
structural reforms, as set out in the memoranda of  understanding. 
2.  Recent economic developments 
Estonia 
After a sharp decline in  1992 and early  1993  the Estonian economy was emerging from 
recession by the end of 1993. GDP grew by 4% in 1994 and about the saine level in 1995 
(4.5%). Unemployment, at about 5%,  remained moderate. Macro-economic stabilisation, 
after price increases which reached hyper-inflationary levels in  1992 and  1993, was to a 
large extent achieved after the introduction in June 1992 of  a currency board arrangement 
under which the monetary base  is  limited  by  the  amo~nt of hard  currencies  and  gold 
detained by the central bank.  A new currency, the Estonian Kroon, was introduced at th" 
same  time.  This  proved  successful  in  stabilising  the  economy:  inflation  dropped  arr 
continued to decline from 42% in  1994 to 29«'/o  in  1995  (year-end figures).  Inflation&  .  · 
pressures remained strong,  however,  in  199S,  particularly in the area of services.  Under 
the currency board arrangement  central bank lending  to the  state is  prohibited,  which 
contributes to budgetary discipline.  In 1995 government expenditure increased above the 
programmed budget, but this increase was counter-balanced by growing tax revenues and 
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social  security  contributions.  The  financial  balance  was  in  surplus  {0.8%  of GOP). 
Increased government deposits in the  banking  sector resulted  in  a  slightly  lower fiscal 
balance surplus (0.3% of  GOP). The 1996 budget envisages an almost balanced budget. 
Estonia  has  already  implemented  the  bulk  of structural  reforms  leading  to  a  market 
economy.  Prices  and  foreign  trade  are  completely  free.  The  small  scale  privatisation 
covering some 1000 small enterprises is now virtually completed. Out of  the 500 medium 
and large scale enterprises about 100 remain in the state's hands and are expected to be 
privatised in  1996, with the exception of natural monopolies.  Land privatisation, which 
was  slow  to  start,  is  being  accelerated.  Financial  sector  reform  appears  as  the  most 
sensitive area. The Bank of  Estonia has increased its supervision capacities and reduced its 
share of assets in the Savings Bank to 25% of the capital.  The state also  reduced below 
10% its minority shareholding in commercial banks.  Capital adequacy requirements are 
being gradually increased.  An action plan was set up to restructure a virtually insolvent 
bank, the North Estonian Bank. 
The Free Trade Agreement with the European Community entered into force on 1 January 
1995.  External  trade  continued  to  grow  at  a  high  pace,  particularly  imports  which 
increased in  1995 by 33% over 1994. Estonia's external trade with the European Union 
increased  markedly  after  independence  and  is  characterised  by  a  large  deficit  on the 
Estonian side.  The overall trade deficit considerably increased to an estimated US$  690 
million,  or 20%  of GOP.  Owing  to  a  positive  services  balance,  particularly  growing 
tourism  receipts  which  grew  to  about  US$  150  million,  the  current  account .  deficit 
remained below this level {285  million  dollars  or about 8%  of GOP,  excluding  official 
transfers). Estonia however succeeded in financing this substantial current account deficit 
with a large capital account surplus: for the third consecutive year the capital account was 
in surplus,  due principally to high inflows of foreign direct investment of about US$ 200 
million.  Official  foreign  exchange  reserves  continued  to  grow  and,  at  US  dollars  580 
million  at end-1995,  covered  approximately  3  months  of imports.  Under the  currency 
board arrangement the Estonian Kroon is pegged to the OM at a fixed  8 to 1 rate.  This 
has led,  given the two digit inflation level,  to a relative loss of external competitiveness 
which remains sustainable given  the low initial rate of peg of the Estonian Kroon to the 
Deutsche Mark and the moderate rate of  industrial price increases.  . 
In March 1995 the IMF. approved a new fifteen-month stand-by arrangement for SDR 14 
million (US$ 21  million), on which the authorities did not make any purchases. 
Latvia 
After  a  sharp  deterioration in  1992  and  1993,  Latvia's  overall  economic  situation  had 
stabilised in  1994: growth was at about 1  %,  inflation continued to slow down,  falling to 
26% at year-end, and the budget deficit remained within 2% of GOP.  In April  1995,  the 
IMF  confirmed  its  support  of the  authorities'  policy  by  approving  a  second  stand-by 
arrangement for a 13-month peri~d. 
In 1995, the budget deficit had initially been programmed to remain at 2% of GOP  as in 
1994. However, Latvia's budget situation deteriorated in early 1995 and the budget deficit 
rose to 92 million lats (US$  184 million) in  1995,  or 4%  of GOP.  Additionally,  a major 
crisis  in  the  banking  sector occurred  in  April  1995  with the  main  Latvian commercial 
bank,  Banka  Baltija,  being  declared  insolvent,  which  alone  accounted  for  20%  of the 
country's  deposits.  By  mid-1995  eight  other banks  had  been  declared  insolvent  and  a 37 
number of  others were no longer allowed to take deposits. Altogether, the.insolvent banks 
represented a  tot~ assets value of orie  third of the total bank assets in the country,  or 
about US$ 1.2 billion. 
As a result of  the crisis, broad money dropped by 10% over the second quarter. However, 
the high percentage of savings held in cash in foreign currencies obviously dampened its 
contractionary effect.  GDP overall declined  by  1.5% in  1995.  Unemployment remained 
stable  at  about  6.3%  by  end-1995.  The  Bank  of Latvia  maintained  its  conservative 
monetary policy stance, and inflation thus continued to slow down,  falling from 26% in 
1994 to about 23% in 1995. 
In the Summer the authorities adopted a package of measures to address immediate and 
long term needs of  the financial sector, by enhancing prudential regulations and setting up 
a deposit insurance scheme. Other structural reforms continued in 1995. The Privatisation 
Agency became fullyoperational and  230 additional firms  were privatised hi  1995.  The 
sale of shares of the Universal Bank, one of the three main public banks,  started in the 
third quarter of the year.  The Free Trade Agreement signed with the European Union 
caine into force on 1 January 1995.  · 
Imports and exports increased markedly in 1995, and reflected the continued shift of  trade 
towards the West.  As in  1994, the trade balance remained negative over the year (  440 
million US$ deficit,  or 10% of GDP).  The positive services balance,  mainly  due to the 
transport sector, allowed· for a current account deficit of about half the size of the trade 
deficit (180 million US$, or 4% ofGDP, excluding official transfers). 
The authorities have successfully pursued a stable eJtchange rate policy with an informal 
peg to the SDR and,  despite speculative attacks which led to a loss of foreign exchange 
amounting to 90 million US dollars in Spring, the Lats exchange rate remained broadly at 
its  previous  level  in  1995.  Under  a  two-digit  inflation  this  translates  into  a  real 
appreciation in the exchange rate.  The overall competitiveness of the economy however 
seems to have been maintained. 
In order to  cover its  current account  deficit  Latvia is  dependant  upon  private  capital 
inflows,  which  remained  substantial  in  1995  in  spite  of the  financial  crisis.  Thus,  the 
damage  of the  crisis  was. contained  and  Latvia's  reserves  position  remained  relatively 
strong, with approximately US$ 600 million net reserves at year-end, which corresponds 
to around 5 months of  imports. The IMF programme went-off track after the Spring crisis 
and its Summer review could not be completed. In early 1996 the IMF staff concluded a 
new stand-by arrangement with the authorities which the IMF board approved in May of 
this year. 
Lithuania 
After four years of recession,  Lithuania's economy began to  show signs  of recovery in 
1994, with a 2% increase in GDP.  Growth for  1995, despite a drop in GDP in the :first 
quarter  of the  year,  is  estimated  at  2.5%,  The  fundamental  growth  trend  is  now 
considered to be solid  and  is  expected to  be  fuelled  by  investment and  export growth. 
Unemployment, however, significantly rose in 1995 to about 7% of  the active population, 
against 2% at the end of 1994. 
Inflation, which had peaked at hyper-inflationary levels in 1992, slowed down in 1993 and 
early 1994.  On 1 April 1994, a currency board arrangement was introduced under which 38 
monetary growth is limited by the market value of gold and hard currencies held  by  the 
Bank of  Lithuania. The reduction in inflation after the introduction of  the currency board 
has been striking:  price increases fell  substantially  in  1994,  at  a year-end  rate of 45%. 
Inflationary pressures however remained in 1995, fuelled by the low foreign exchange rate 
of the litas and increases of public prices.  As a result,  inflation,  with an estimated 35% 
(year-end rate),  remained above the authorities' initial target (25%)  in  1995.  The fiscal 
deficit target (GOP 3.4%) for 1995 was broadly met, despite weak revenue performance 
in early 1995 which forced the government to cut expenditure. 
Structural reforms have been further implemented.  Prices had already been liberalised in 
1993. The only items with prices remaining under government control relate to cases of 
monopolistic situations. The bankruptcy law,  which has started to be implemented, was 
redrafted in  early  1996  in  order to  make  it  more  operational.  Housing and  small-scale 
privatisation are now virtually completed but, owing to delays in the establishment of  the 
Privatisation Agency, large scale privatisation has  been delayed until  1996.  The financial 
sector reform is  the most sensitive  area.  After the enactment of the Central Bank and 
Commercial  Bank  laws  in  early  1995  and  the  subsequent  tightening  of prudential 
regulations, the banking sector went through drastic adjustments and 4 small banks (out of 
initially 28) were declared insolvent and  will in  most  cases  eventually be liquidated.  In 
December the crisis worsened when two medium-sized banks,  Litimpeks and Innovative 
Bank, were also  declared insolvent.  The authorities, with IMF and World Bank support, 
prepared  a new  set of measures to consolidate  the three  major  state-owned banks,  to 
create  a  depositors  insurance  scheme  and  to  review  the  commercial  banking ·law. 
Compensation to depositors of the insolvent banks amounted to 30 million litas (i.e.  half 
the total of their estimated losses),  of which 20  million were programmed in  the  1996 
Budget. Parliament eventually approved, in June 1996, .a law to re-nationalise Innovation 
Bank and to recapitalize it with resources collected from new issues of  government bonds, 
amounting to the equivalent of 250 million  US  dollars.  Bad  loans  from  the Innovation 
bank as well as from the state-owned Commercial bank and Savings bank were transferred 
to a newly established ad hoc bad loans agency. 
For the third consecutive year the trade balance was in deficit (US$ 335 million,  or 4.5% 
of GOP), with exports increasing slightly faster than imports (respectively 15% and  13% 
increases).  The shift of trade towards the West continued,  and  was  reflected  in  higher 
growth rates of west-oriented trade flows (more than 20%).  The weak point of external 
trade  remains  the  energy  balance  (deficit:  5.7%  of GOP),  with  imports  of energy 
representing 40% of  the total imports. The current account deficit remained near the level 
of 1994  (US$  250 million,  or about 2.3%  of GOP,  excluding  official  transfers).  On  1 
January 1995, the Free Trade Agreement with the European Union entered into force. 
The uncertainties  in  the  area of the  local  banking  sector translated  into  lower private 
capital inflows than in the previous years (US$  135  million),  and which did not counter-
balance the current account deficit.  In December the Central Bank  lo~t US$ 45  million of 
reserves as a result of the crisis of confidence after Litimpex Bank and Innovation Bank 
were declared insolvent. Significant medium- and long-term borrowing (US$ 230 million) 
was necessary to cover the remaining financing needs, out of which US$ 60 million were 
borrowed on the private capital market in December.  At year-end official reserves were 
estimated at about US$ 800 million, or 3.5 months of  imports. 
The IMF Board approved in  June  1996 the third  review  of the current programme,  an 
SDR  134.55  million  three-year  (1994-1997)  Extended  Fund  Facility  fEFF).  This  will 39 
contribute to consolidate the reserves and help finance key energy and investment related 
imports. 
3.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
Owing to the expected increasing demand for investment related hard currency finance, 
and  to the track record of surplus  of the three countries'  external capital  account,  the 
Commission,.  after  consulting  Member  States  exceptionally  agreed  in  supplemental 
memoranda of  understanding signed with the authorities in 1994 and  1995 to channel the 
bulk of  the loans' second tranche through the banking sector, for sound bankable projects 
in need of  hard currency financing. 
Economic stabilisation and progress of structural reforms conditionality criteria attached 
to the Community macro-financial assistance have been satisfactorily met in Estonia. The 
Estonian authorities however, after having considered drawing the loan's second tranche 
in 1994, eventually did not request its disbursement in 1995. 
In Latvia the IMF programme went off-track after the financial  and budgetary crisis in 
Spring  1995,  and the normal Autumn review of the stand-by programme could  not be 
completed. In June the Latvian authorities requested the release of  the Community loan's 
second tranche (ECU 40 million).  Commission services subsequently went on_mission in 
July to assess the situation and  seek explanations from the authorities on their intended 
use of the funds.  The authorities  made  it  clear that the funds  would be channelled  to 
refund small depositors which had lost their savings in the bankruptcy of Banka Baltija. 
The Commission considered that this would be inconsistent with the general aim of the 
EC  macro-financial assistance,  which is  to finance  balance-of-payments external related 
needs and not to cover internal budgetary financing needs. This would also be inconsistent 
with the normal conditionality criteria of  the loan (including a satisfactory track record of 
the IMF  programme)  and  with the undertaking of the  Memorandum of Understanding 
signed in  1994 relating to the loan's second tranche.  Accordingly,  the Commission, after 
having consulted the Member States, declined the authorities' request  to release the loan's 
second tranche in October 1995. 
In the case of  Lithuania, the Authorities requested the disbursement of  the second tranche 
(ECU 50  million)  of Community  assistance  in  early  1995.  On  account  of progress of 
stabilisation  and  reforms,  particularly  in  the  areas  of privatisation  and  of the  banking 
sector prudential regulations, Lithuania complied with the conditionality criteria attached 
to the release of  the second tranche. A Memorandum of  Understanding relative to the use 
of proceeds under this second tranche was signed in ,July.  As  already foreseen in Latvia 
and  Estonia,  it was  agreed  that the use  of proceeds  of the  second  tranche  would  be 
earmarked  for  sound  bankable  projects  and  channelled  through  banks  complying  with 
Central  Bank  prudential  regulations.  Owing  to  the  local  banking  sector's  limited 
absorption capacity,  it was agreed to split the second tranche in  two separate ECU 25 
million  instalments  and  to  release  the  first  one,  which  the  Commission  disbursed  in 
August.  The authorities decided to  channel the bulk of the funds  through two medium-
sized banks complying with central bank sound banking criteria.  In September however 
the  Commission  requested  a  freeze  in  the  use  of proceeds  of Community  assistance 
pending improvements in the envisaged consultation process. In November, Commission 
services  went  on  mission  to  Vilnius  and  requested  further  improvements  in  the 
management of  the Community macro-financial assistance. 40 
In spite of  internal tensions, particularly in the financial sector area, the Baltic economies 
have successfully implemented  the  core reforms leading to a market economy  and have 
overall been performing remarkably well. The growth trend is now considered to be solid, 
and  the  level  of external  financing  needs  which  had  been  anticipated  when  the  IMF 
concluded the first generation of stand-by arrangements in late 1992 has eventually, to a 
large  extent,  been  covered  by  private  capital  inflows.  The  scope  for  external  official 
macro-financial  assistance  has  been  more  limited  than  initially  anticipated,  and  the 
Commission thus did not release the full amount of  Community macro-financial assistance 
initially approved.  External tensions on. the Baltic countries' balance of payments remain 
possible on .account of  growth-driven increasing trade deficits. The Commission will keep 
the situation under regular review. 41 
V.  BELARUS 
1.  Introduction 
Belarus,  which  had  been  one  of the  most  developed  republics  under. the  command 
economy regime of  the Former Soviet Union (FSU), embarked on reforms later than most 
countries in the region.  A first limited set of reforms were launched  in  1993  and were 
supported  by  the  IMF  with  a  Systemic  Transformation  Facility  (STF)  first  tranche. 
Following the Presidential  elections in  July  1994,  the authorities  launched  stabilisation 
reforms in the second part of 1994 and in early 1995. The IMF released the second ·sTF 
tranche by end-January 1995. The conclusion of  a more ambitious programme in the form 
of  a stand-by arrangement, initially envisaged for March 1995 was postponed pending the 
adoption of  new reforms. The IMF board eventually approved a stand-by arrangement on 
12  Septe~ber 1995. 
On 10 April  1995  the Council of the European Union9  approved a Community macro-
financial  assistance  to  Belarus  in  the  form  of a  1  0-year  loan,  conditional·, upon  the 
conclusion  of an  IMF  stand-by  arrangement,  to  support  the  country's  programme  of 
macro-economic adjustment and structural reforms. On the basis of preliminary estimates 
from the IMF of  the country's residual external financing gap for 1995, the amount of  the 
Community  assistance was  set  at a  maximum  of·  ECU ·  7  5 million.  In addition,  it  was 
understood  that  the  mobilisation  of Community  macro-financial  assistance  to  Belarus 
would require that the country fully  met its financial  obligations to the Community in a 
timely manner. 
2.  Macroeconomic performance 
The drop of  production in Belarus was in the initial stage of  transition lower than in other 
FSU countries, with GDP down by about 10% per year in 1992 and 1993, which was less 
than in Russia.  However, a considerable drop (-20%) was recorded in  1994, one of the 
most severe in the countries in transition, follewed by  a further  10% decrease in  199 5. 
Investment dramatically declined  over the last five  years below  50% of its  1990 level. 
Inter-republican payments and trade in the FSU collapsed in  1993  resulting in a general 
deterioration of  enterprises' situation in Belarus. Inter-enterprise and bank credits. piled up, 
with Central Bank unlimited  refinancing  of the  banking  system,  which triggered  price 
increases reaching hyper-inflationary levels  in  1993  and  1994.  The general government 
deficit remained under control, however, below 2% ofGDP in both 1993 and 1994. 
Belarus left  the Russian rouble  zone  only  in  April  1994  when the Belarus rouble  was 
declared the only legal tender in the country. Stringent monetary policy was implemented 
from early 1995. As a result, inflation dropped from 40% per month in January to 2.5% in 
June  and,  despite  high  increases  of public  utilities  tariffs,  the  authorities  succeeded  in 
stabilising inflation which remained below an  average  monthly 5% until the end  of the 
year.  Market mechanisms for  the allocation of  ce~tral bank credits were  introduced  in 
early 199 5.  The authorities pursued over the year a flexible interest rate policy aiming at 
maintaining positive and  attractive real interest rates,  so  as to mobilise  rouble deposits 
within the banking  system.  The  positive real interest rates and  a tight  monetary policy 
contributed to stabilise the Belarus rouble in nominal terms at 11500 rouble per US dollar, 
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and led to-a significant appreciation in real terms against the dollar (+340% over the year 
1995). The budget deficit, at 2.3% of GOP for 1995, was limited within the level agreed 
with the IMF. The bulk of  this deficit was financed internally. 
The current account which had been in deficit in  1993  and  1994 (about ~10% of GOP), 
remained negative in  1995 (-3.5% of GOP).  The competitiveness of Belarus' exports to 
the west was reduced by raising import tariffs to Russian levels as a result of  the entry into 
force of  the Customs Union with Russia in early 1995. Despite fears of  a loss of external 
markets,  1995  recorded a high growth of exports (+75%).  Imports,  at the same  time, 
increased by 65%, and the trade balance, as  a consequence, remained in  deficit (-6% of 
GOP).  B~larus progressively lifted restrictions on foreign exchange transactions in  1995 
and thus moved towards current account convertibility. 
3.  Structural reform 
Initial progress in the area of structural reform had  only  recently been undertaken and 
remain a weak point in Belarus. Cross subsidisation of  households by industry with regard 
to  energy  prices  was high.  A first  wave  of adjustment  of public  prices  took place  in 
Autumn  1994,  when prices  on communal  services  were  increased.  Rents,  water  and 
heating increased by factors of  42, 24 and 9, respectively. Further increases took place in 
early 1995. The number of"monopolistic enterprises", for which prices are regulated, was 
reduced from about 350 in mid-1994 to 50 in mid-1995.  As  a result,  most prices have 
now been freed.  Public sector prices, which are still highly  subsidised, were increased in 
July to 60% of cost recovery levels and further adjusted in December  to 80% of these 
levels.  State orders in production and procurement have been reduced to 6% of  the total 
output but remained particularly high in the agricultural sector. 
Most import licences requirements and the surrender requirements on exports had been 
abolished by end-1994 and early 1995. External trade however remained subject to some 
limitations. Export taxes which had been abolished in December 1994 were reintroduced 
in early 1995 as a result of  the entry into force 9f  the Customs Union with Russia. (At the 
time  of .  writing  this  report  the  authorities  have  reintroduced,  in  early  1996,  new 
administrative limitations on external trade and foreign exchange transactions). 
The banking sector is burdened with bad loans and remains globally inefficient.  Progress 
was made  recently on accounting  standards,  but external  auditing  remains  scarce.  The 
authorities recently raised capital requirements tor banks from ECU 1 million to ECU 2 
million.  It was  further  decided  to  proceed  with  the  liquidation of two  small  insolvent 
banks.  Inter-enterprise_ arrears reportedly accounted for more than 50% of GOP by end-
1995. Actions to improve enterprises' financial discipline were adopted but seemed to be 
inefficient in the absence of effective bankruptcy sanctions,  owing mainly to the lack of 
clear mechanisms  to declare  enterprises insolvent  (a  revised  Bankruptcy  law  was  later 
approved  in  May  1996).  In  the  context  of high  energy  prices,  loss  of markets  and 
increasing payments arrears,  profitability in enterprises has  been cut by  about 50% over 
the last three years. The number of  loss-making enterprises increased significantly in  1995 
up to 29% of  the total (April1996 figures, on the basis of 1995 accounts). 
P.rivatisation is  only at an initial stage. Enterprises representing no  more than 6% of the 
total asset value had been privatised by end-1995.  The privatisation of small enterprises, 
which has been the most rapidly conducted part of privatization in  countries of Central 
· and Eastern Europe was delayed in Belarus due to  rigid  auctioning procedures,  and,  by 
the  end  of  199 5,  only  12%  of small  enterprises  had  been  privati sed.  A  voucher 43 
privatisation programme approved in 1994 was _designed to cover the subscription of  50% 
of the total assets to be privatised,  but the distribution of vouchers to the population, 
which was to be completed  by  end-1995  was  substantially  delayed.  The  privatisation 
process overall slowed down in 1995. 
The process of reforms in agriculture has  also  been slow.  Agricultural prices were only 
freed  in  early  1995,  while  input  prices  of the  agricultural  sector had  been liberalized 
earlier,  leading  to  a  squeeze  in  profitability  of the  state-owned  farms  and  to  the 
accumulation of arrears, in particular on energy supplies.  About 20% of the sovkhozes 
and kolkhozes farms were transformed into joint-stock enterprises. However, privatisation 
had not yet started by end-1995  and  is  likely to be particularly complicated under such 
difficult financial circumstances. There is further scope for reform of  the ownership status 
of agricultural land, which by law is  the state•s property and can only be leased for 99 
years, without possibility to sell or mortgage leases. 
4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
.After approval on 12 September 1995 by the IMF board of  the first stand-by arrangement 
with Belarus, in late September Commission services went on mission to Belarus to assess 
the economic and financial  situation and  discuss with the authorities of the country the 
·terms and conditions of  the Community macro-financial assistance. 
A  Memorandum  of Understanding  setting  out  the  macro-economic  and  structural 
transformation conditions attached to the Community assistance was agreed. Beyond the 
respect  of the  macro-economic  performance  criteria  foreseen  in  the  IMF  stand-by 
arrangement, the Belarus authorities undertook significant commitments in several areas 
of structural  reform (price  liberalisation,  privatisation  and  enterprise  reform,  financial 
discipline of enterprises and banking reform),  on which progress will be essential for the 
disbursement of  the second tranche of  the assistance. 
Over the programme period of  the IMF stand-by arrangement (July 1995 - June 1996) the  , 
country•s external financing needs have been estimated at about US$ 600 million, almost 
half of which would be covered by  the IMF.  The Community contribution,  taking into 
account the revised residual gap, was set at ECU 55  million and,  matched together with 
the other bilateral donors• contributions, contributed to fully cover the residual balance-of-
payments financing gap. The amount of the first tranche was set at ECU 30 million,  and 
disbursement took place in December 1995. 44 
VI.  BULGARIA 
1..  Introduction 
In  1995,  the  Bulgarian  economy  witnessed  continued,  modest  progre$S  in  terms  of 
stabilization and  growth both in the  public  and  private  sector,  essentially  reflecting  a 
relatively unambitious policy programme launched by the new Government, following the 
December  1994  elections.  On  ~e other  hand,  developments  in  the  area  of structural 
reform continued to disappoint, particularly as regards the adoption of  measures aimed at 
·accelerating privatization· and addressing significant managerial and financial problems of 
the domestic banking sector which continues to be overburdened by  a huge number of 
non~performing loans. 
The  insufficient  progress  on  overall  economic  reform  and  lack  of credibility  in  the 
government's policy programme for 1995 led to a declining confidence of  the International 
Financial Institutions, Western commercial banks and private investors. 
The deterioration in the western perception of Bulgaria's financial  risk and a number of 
fundamental  reserves  repeatedly  expressed  by  the  IFis  on the  pace  of the  country's 
structural  adjustment  in  1995  was  a  major  setback  for.  the  Bulgarian  authorities, 
particularly if one takes into  account that in  1994  both the IMF,  the World Bank and 
western commercial creditor hanks agreed on a major, global assistance package in favour 
of Bulgaria.  In fact,  in April  1994 the Fund approved a twelve-month Stand-by  fac~lity 
worth 97 million associated with a Systemic Transformation Facility for US$ 324 million 
and  in  September,  same  year,  it  decided,  together  with  the  World  Bank,  further  to 
augment its financial  contribution by  US$ 225  million.  Moreover, in April  1994 a Paris 
Club  debt  rescheduling  arrangement  was  agreed  with  official  creditors  and  this  was 
followed by a debt and debt service reduction programme (DDSR) agreed with Western 
commercial banks in July. 
In the event, the Fund's assistance was suspended in late 1994 and failure to reach a new 
agreement for further funding  in  1995,  due  to  disagreements  on the compliance of the 
Bulgarian  government  with .the  Fun~ and  the  World  Bank's  macro-economic  and 
structural  adjustment  conditions  led  to  a  further  worsening  of the  country's  external 
financial  position  at  the  end  of 1995  and  during  the  beginning  of 1996.  Continuing 
absence  of external  financial  assistance,  very  low  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI), 
{particularly  if compared  with  other central  and  Eastern European  countries)  and  the  · 
steady erosion in the country's foreign currency reserves has brought Bulgaria again on 
the verge of  an external payment crisis. And this is particularly disturbing, in view of  huge 
external debt-related obligations falling due in 1996 and beyond (in excess of US$  1 bn a 
year). 
In the  framework  of the  G-24  coordination  process,  the  Community  decided  in  April 
199410  to reconfirm its commitment of a loan of ECU  110  million,  decided  in  October 
1992. The release of  a "first. tranche (ECU 70 million) took place in December 1994. 
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2.  Macroeconomic performance 
The policy programme fof 1995, approved only in May by the newly elected government, 
was a rather uncertain ana unclear compromise between the demand on the one hand, to 
rein in high inflation via moderately restrictive monetary, income and fiscal. policies, attain · 
exchange rate stabilization,  sustain output growth,  investment  and  export and,  on the 
other,  to  minimize  the  social  costs  of the  country's  economic  transformation  by 
postponing privatization and granting a generous social safety net. 
Key measures aiming at enhancing financial discipline in selected large loss-making state 
owned enterprises or, if required, liquidating them, rehabilitating banks and strengthening 
bank  supervision  were  either  postponed  or  insufficient,  thereby  jeopardizing  the 
sustainability of  macroeconomic stabilization. 
After five years of  recession, the economy began a recovery in 1994. Real GOP grew by 
1.4%, followed by an increase of2.6% in 1995. A sharp depreciation of  the lev in Spring 
1994 boosted exports and  industrial output,  while  imports were reduced.  The foreign 
trade balance swung from a deficit of almost US$ l  billion in 1993  to a surplus of over 
US$ 400 million in 1995. Reserves of  foreign exchange held by the central bank rose from 
US$ 0.6 billion at the start of 1994 to US$ 1.5 billion by mid-1995. 
Industrial production increased by  5% in 1994.  The rise in output was concentrated in 
chemicals  and  basic  metallurgy.  These  sectors  were  able  to  expand  exports,  their 
competitive  advantage  deriving  from  the  currency  depreciation  and  also  from  cheap 
energy. Up until very recently, energy prices remained below world levels. 
Other macroeconomic indicators also pointed to positive economic developments.  The 
budget deficit, which had been in double digits as a percentage of GOP during the early 
years of  the 1990s, was cut to 7% in 1994 and 1995. Having peaked at over 16% of  the 
labour force in early 1994, the unemployment rate fell  to under 11% in mid-1995.  The 
rate of inflation slowed, from an average monthly rate in the range of 4  to 6% during 
1992-1994, to below 2% per month in Spring and Summer 1995. 
The reduction in inflation was ·helped by ·a prolonged period of stability in the nominal 
exchange rate, but also by increased Government intervention in markets, reversing earlier 
liberalization measures.  Weighted by their share in the consumer price index  "basket", 
approximately  50% of goods are now subject to some form of official  monitoring or 
control.  One  consequence  of these  measures,  combined  with  low  domestic  wheat 
purchase prices and ineffective export controls, is the emergence of  bread queues. 
In general,  the  improvement  in  macroeconomic  performance  was not  based  on solid 
microeconomic, or structural foundations.  In the financial and enterprise sectors, lack of 
progress in restructuring and privatization contributed to the development of  a symbiotic 
relationship  between banks  and  companies.  Unprofitable  enterprises  with loan  arrears 
continued to have access to credit from banks. Banks continued lending to enterprises in 
the expectation - based on past experience - that the state would ultimately bail them out. 
The central bank implicitly colluded with this situation by providing uncollateralized loans 
to commercial banks. 
By the second half of 1995, there were increasing signs that the economic situation was 
unsustainable. The growth in industrial output slowed to below 2% for the year. The price 
advantage  conferred  by  the  Spring  1994  currency  ~epreciation  was  eroded  by  the 46 
subsequent exchange rate stability and the differential between domestic and foreign cost 
increases. Consumer price inflation accelerated somewhat, and the exchange rate began to 
come under pressure. Foreign exchange reserves declined as the central bank intervened in 
s1:1pport of  the lev. 
The country is  regularly meeting its external debt-related obligations stemming from the 
implementation of  the Paris Club debt rescheduling arrangement and DDSR arrangement 
with.the London Club creditor banks. In 1995, debt-related payments amounted to some 
US$ 718 million. 
Following  the  arrangements,  Bulgaria's  relations  with  the  international  financial 
community  h~ve been restored but the recent eruption of a  new financial  crisis  in the 
country's banking  system and  declining  confidence in  the currency  has  again increased 
Bulgaria's financial risk with depressive effects on the value of"Brady bonds" .. 
3.  Structural reforms 
Despite a number of  constraints, policy slippages and weak management, Bulgaria was  in 
1995  successful in preserving previous policy achievements such as trade liberalization, 
current  account  convertibility  and  a  liberalized  exchange  rate  regime.  Undoubtedly, 
maintaining  this  "acquis"  may  become  more  problematic  particularly  in  view  of the 
country's new financial fragility, exchange rate volatility, loss of  confidence on the lev and 
the insufficient speed in the struct4ral adjustment process. 
The progress in trade liberalization has been encouraging but uneven.  In 1995, Bulgaria 
implemented a liberalized customs policy (in particular in trade with the EU) but at the 
same  time  it  adopted  a  number  of temporary  import  restrictions  aimed  at  protecting 
selected domestic industries and agriculture,  such as minimum import prices,  restrictive 
import licenses, tariff quotas etc. 
Bulgaria still  operates export quotas,  export fees  and  export taxes  on selected goods. 
Occasional export bans. were imposed in  1993  on industrial products but were eventually 
lifted in July 1995.  Bulgaria's Interim Association Agreement with the EU entered into 
force on January 1,  1994. 
The progressive adoption of an outward-oriented trade regime has been associated with 
efforts aimed at further liberalizing the exchange rate regime.  A major liberalization was 
introduced  in  February  1994  whereby  foreign  exchange  ceilings  for  current  personal 
payments (tourism etc.) by  residents have been raised  significantly  and  current account 
convertibility is ensured for trade related payments. Some restrictions on current payments 
and transfers are however still in force.  Residents are allowed to hold  foreign currency 
deposit  accounts  (export  proceeds  are  subject  to  repatriation  but  not  a  surrender 
requirement).  Some  inter-governmental  clearing  and  barter  arrangements  with  third 
countries were also terminated in 199 5. 
As regards the reform of the state enterpri.se sector, the new government has pursued its 
strategy based upon three main "pillars", i.e.  the implementation of financial rescue plans 
for state enterprises (SOEs), enterprise restructuring and privatization. Moreover, policy 
implementation was delayed by political conflict, policy and administrative shortcomings, 
lack of  commitment to harden budget constraints on SOEs, insufficient financial resources 47 
and  a weak  banking  system.  In  this  respect,  1995  has  been  a  sort of transition  year 
towards  a  more  decisive  and  ambitious  reform  programme  which  presently  is  being 
prepared, for implementation in 1996. 
The  financial  rescu~ strategy  lays  its  foundation  on  a  law  passed  in  December  1993 
authorizing  the  government  to  issue  long-term  bonds  in  both  domestic  and  foreign 
currency aimed at replacing uncollectable lev and  dollar-denominated loans and interest 
arrears accumulated in banks' portfolios by  end of 1991.  Loans to state enterprises will 
therefore be borne by the government which eventually may convert them into equity or 
decide  for  their  write-off or  rescheduling  as  soon  as  companies  are  restructured  or 
privatized. In the end of 1995 Bulgaria had concluded some 77 privatization deals where 
domestic debt bonds were used in debt-equity swaps amounting to 2.9 bn leva. Few more 
privatizations  were  also  carried  out  through  debt-for-equity  swaps ·with  the  use  of 
government "Brady bonds"  (issued on the occasion of the DDRS  arrangement) held  by 
Western investors. 
In the field  of restructuring, steps were taken late in  1995  with a view to strengthening 
SOEs' financial discipline. Loss reduction and rationalization plans were prepared as well 
as  a  list  for  closing  non  viable  enterprises  or  to  put  them  into  "financial  isolation", 
implying  that  all  banks  would  be  prohibited  from  extending  further  loans  to  them. 
However, these plans were not implemented. 
The privatization programme approved in June 1995 listed some 600 eligible firms but at 
the same time it indicated some key sectors (such as energy, railways,  mining etc.) which 
would  be  excluded  from  the  programme.  Large  SOEs  will  be  only  partly  privatized, 
reflecting the new government strategy to keep a significant state control in any sizeable 
firm.  In  1995  the Privatization Agency completed only 69 privatization deals (out of 170 
deals originally envisaged for  1995) with total proceeds of 12.1  bn leva (of which only 3 
bn  paid  in cash and  the rest by  swapping government foreign  and  domestic debt bonds 
into enterprise equity).  · 
Furthermore,  in  1995  a mass  privatization scheme was launched,  involving  some  1000 
public  enterprises.  Sale  of vouchers  began  in  January  1996  and  sell-off tenders  are 
expected to be issued by the autumn. 
The situation of  the Bulgarian banking system worsened considerably during 1995 and the 
beginning  of I 996  reflecting  continuing  undercapitalization,  inadequate  management, 
insufficient  supervision  by  the  BNB,  lack  of  financial  discipline  ("easy  credit"), 
fragmentation  and  a  growing  amount  of non  performing  loans  to  enterprises.  Despite 
some  measures  taken  in  1994  and  1995  focusing  on  the  strengthening  of the  bank 
supervision capability at the BNB  and implementing a bank consolidation programme by 
the Bank Consolidation Company (BCC), the situation deteriorated so much (particularly 
in two main banks, Mineralbank and Economicbank) that presently the country's financial 
system is on the verge of  collapse. 
In order to address the problem of  the banking system, the Bulgarian authorities presently 
envisage  a number of new,  wide-reaching measures such  as  limiting  new credits by  the 
BNB,  further  strengthening  of  bank  supervision,  removal  from  office  of  banks' 
administrators  and  bank  licenses  revocation.  More  medium-term  strategies  being 48 
considered include the closure on financial stabilization of  public enterprises which are the 
biggest debtors to these two "ailing"  banks and,  in  parallel,  their financial  restructuring 
and recapitalization, in view of  their subsequent privatization. 
4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
The disbursement of the ECU 110 million Community loan decided in October 1992 in 
the framework ofG-24, as a complement to the.IMF assistance to Bulgaria, was delayed 
as the 1992 stand-by arrangement with the Fund went off track. For the.same reason no 
other  G-24  assistance  was  released  under  this  initial  package.  At  the  end  of 1993 
conditions were restored for the resumption ofEU/G-24 assistance to Bulgaria. Following 
the adoption of a new IMF stand-by arrangement, on May 16,  1994, the Council agreed 
with the Commission that the 1992 decision on Community macro-financial assistance to 
.  Bulgaria could be re-activated in the context of  the new programme. The release of a first 
tranche (ECU 70 million) took place in December 1994 on the basis of  the approval of  the 
new IMF Stand-by and the debt relief arrangement agreed between creditors. The release 
of the second tranche is  conditional upon observance  by  Bulgaria of standard macro-
economic performance criteria including a satisfactory track record of  the IMF Stand -by, 
a proper implementation ofDDSR operation and progress with structural reform. 49 
Vll.MOLDOVA 
1.  Introduction 
On 13  June  1994· the Council of the European Union decided to grant  ~he Republic of 
Moldova a loan of  ECU 45  million with a maximum duration of ten years11  to assist the 
country in its efforts to transform its economy to a market economy and to strengthen the 
reserve position of  the central bank. The Coliununity loan was part of an over~  package 
mobilised by the international donor community in favour of  Moldova to complement the . 
resources  provided  by  the  IMF  and  the  World  B&nk.  The  first  tranche  of the  lo~ 
amounting to ECU 25 million, was disbursed in December 1994. The disbursement of  the 
second  tranche  which  was  subject  to  the  fulfilment  of conditions  specified  in  the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)  attached to  the loan agreement,  took place in 
August 1995. 
2.  Macroeconomic performance 
Fallowing the introduction, in N  ovembe~ 1993,  of its national currency - the Moldovan 
leu, Moldova has made a decisive tum towards financial stabilisation in the context of  the 
IS-month economic programme supported by an IMF stand-by arrangement (approved in 
December  1993)  and  complementary  assistance  from  the  international  community, 
including the ECU 45 million Community loan.  · 
In March 1995,  a new stand-by arrangement was approved by  the IMF to support the 
1995  economic  programme  of the  Moldovan  government.  The  objectives  of this 
programme were the  consolidation of financial  stabilisation  and  the implementation of 
structural transformation measures to restore economic growth. 
After  a  31%  decline  in  GDP  in  "1994,  due  to  severe  weather  conditions  and  to  the 
continuing  disruptions  to  output  and  trade  associated  with  the  collapse  of central 
planning, Moldova•s economic recession appea.red to have bottomed out and preliminary 
estimates indicate that real  GDP,  including  that of the region of Transnistria,  fell  by  3 
percent  in  1995,  which  suggests  a  modest  rise  in  activity  in  the  economy  excluding· 
Transnistria. This improvement was partly due to a recovery in the important agricultural 
sector with the return of normal climatic conditions - a rise of some 4% was registered, 
but also to a reduction in the rate of  decline of  industrial production, which is estimated to 
have dropped by 
110nly
11  10%. Official unemployment remained relatively low, i.e. at some 
2% by end-1995, but a lot ofworkers were on unpaid leave and the actual unemployment 
figure far exceeded 10%. Real wages rose in 1995 but dollar wages, which averaged US$ 
32 per month, remained low compared to those of  neighbouring countries. 
The 1995  programme•s key monetary objective was to cut inflation to a sustainable, low 
level  through tight  credit  policy.  The  National  Bank  of Moldova  (NBM)  successfully 
achieved  this aim in the first  half of 1995:  monthly rates below 0.75% were registered, 
compared  to  annual  inflation  of about  800%  in  1993  and  120%  in  1994.  However, 
inflationary  pressures  re-emerged  in  the  autumn  of 1995.  These  were  partly  due  to 
increases in administered prices and seasonal increases in food  prices, but also to strong 
capital inflows, which were unsterilized since the NBM was reluctant to allow a significant 
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appreciation of the leu.  In the fourth quarter,  as  the inflationary consequences of these 
policies were becoming apparent, the central bank tightened monetary policy, which was 
reflected  in upward pressure  on interest  rates.  With an  average  monthly  rate of 3. 5% 
between September and December, inflation reached 24% for the whole year, the lowest 
in the CIS. 
The fiscal performance improved in 1995, with the general government cash deficit falling 
from 9% ofGDP in 1994 to 5.5% in 1995, not so far from the 3.5% official target.  The 
deficit was financed by higher-than-expected net foreign financing - mainly postponement 
of  repayments due to Russia - and by higher  -than-expected sales of  government securities. 
A severe control of expenditure - falling from 30.2% of GOP in 1994 to 28.5% in 1995 -
was necessary to make this  reduction possible.  On the revenue side,  VAT receipts and 
land  tax collections were particularly  strong.  Revenue  collection  remained  insufficient, 
however- 24% ofGDP against 23.5% in 1994- and privatisation receipts were far below 
expectations, because of a lack of domestic capital. Both revenue and expenditure arrears 
- including almost all wage arrears - were reduced as a percentage of  GOP. 
The  balance  of payments  remained  under  severe  pressure  in  the  first  half of 1995, 
primarily  because  of the  continued  impact  of the  terms-of-trade  shock  caused  by  the 
increase in imported energy prices to world market levels.  In the second half of the year, 
however, a better-than-expected export performance coupled with an important reduction 
in energy imports resulted in the trade balance showing only a small deficit. For the whole 
year, the current account deficit was just over US$ 100 million, or 6% of GOP. Moldova 
was  still  highly  dependent  on  foreign  assistance,  medium- and  long-term  loans 
representing  an  important  part of capital  inflows  in  1995.  Disbursements  of assistance 
came  from  the  EU,  the  USA,  Japan  and  the  Bretton )Voods  institutions  for  a  gross 
amount of some US$  120 million.  Direct investment remained low at US$ 22 million in 
1995,  to be compared to US$  18  million in  1994.  Complementary to  this  amount,  the 
balance of payments recorded in  1995 a US$  41  million foreign investment representing 
equity swapped for debt to the Russian company Gazprom.  Gross reserves of the central 
bank reached  about US$  260  million  by  end.:.1995,  or the  equivalent  of 4  months  of 
imports, compared to 3 months at end-1994 and 1.4 months by the end of 1993.  · 
By the end of  June 1995, Moldova accepted the obligations of Article VIII, sections 2,  3 
and  4 of the IMF's  Articles of Agreement  and  has  since  then  maintained  an  exchange 
system free of  restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. 
The  Moldovan  leu,  introduced  in  November  1993,  was  remarkably  stable  during  the 
whole of 1995, having fluctuated in a narrow band around Mdl4.5 per US$. 
All  quantitative  performance  criteria  under  the  SBA-supported  IMF  programme  were 
observed  for  all  quarters of 1995.  A new  3-year programme has  been prepared by  the 
Moldovan  authorities,  and  a  request  for  an  EFF  to  support  this  programme  will  be 
considered by the. IMF Board in May 1996. Prior actions will however have to be taken, 
notably in the area of energy policy (price rise to provide cost recovery)  and  price and 
trade liberalisation (reduction of  import tariffs, abolition of  excise taxes on exports to non-
CIS, amendment of  the system of  reference prices for exports). 
Arrears remained a substantial problem in Moldova in 1995, despite the progress made by 
the Government in reducing its own arrears, and even though some progress were made in 
stabilising  the situation.  Several measures  have  already been  implemented  to  tackle the 
problem and further measures are envisaged in the new programme. 51 
3.  Structural reforms 
Important  measures  were  initiated  in  1995.  The  privatisation  process  slowed  in  early 
1995,  owing  partly  to  a  "wait-and-see"  attitude  of enterprise  managers  for  the  new 
1995/96  Pnvatisation Programme,  finally  approved  by  Parliament  in  March  1995.  It 
gathered momentum in  the following  months,  however,  and  according to  Government 
estimates,  2200  enterprises,  representing  about  70%  of the  economy  were  privatised 
through  the  voucher  programme,  concluded  in  November  1995.  Cash  privatisation 
revenues were however disappointing:  44  enterprises were privatised for  an amount of 
Mdl 22 million (about US$ 5 million), to be compared to a schedule of 200 enterprises. to 
be privatised for an estimated value ofMdl 140 million (about US$ 30 million). Important 
to note is  the  role of fiduciary  companies  and  investment  funds  which,  following  first 
estimates, subscribed about 70% of total shares. The development of a securities market 
will however be vital to the final  success of the privatisation process.  In this respect, the 
start in June  1995  of the Moldovan Stock Exchange operations was an important step. 
Satisfactory progress has been registered since then,  especially when compared with the 
experience  of other  stock  exchanges  at  a  similar  stage  of development.  Concerning 
apartments  and  housing,  roughly  70%  of all  apartments  were  privatised,  and  housing 
privatisation  is  scheduled  to  be  completed  by  mid-96.  Progress  in  privatisation  of 
agriculture has been slow:  a number of state farms and collectives have been transformed 
into joint stock companies but land cannot be transferred for cash - and this will  remain 
the  case  until  2001  under  the  present  law,  which  represents  a  legal  impediment  to 
privatisation of  agriculture. 
Important progress was recorded in enterprise restructuring: liquidation proceedings were 
initiated  against  20  state  enterprises,  of which  10  were  completed.  However,  much 
remains to be done to enforce financial  discipline.  Progress in bankruptcy and  collateral 
laws  has  been slow:  the bankruptcy law,  still  under discussion in  Parliament,  will  need 
substantial revision to reach international standards. 
The  maximum  import  tariff was  lowered  to  20%  in  December  1995,  with  a  few 
exceptions, and the remaining export quotas - on grain  and grain products - was lifted. 
However,  the  1996  draft  budget,  presented  by  the  Government  in  November  1995, 
included provisions on tariffs and export taxation, which raised fears of a reversal of the 
significant  trade  liberalisation  advances  made  over  the  past  two  years.  As  already 
indicated, these trade measures will have to be cancelled to allow for the adoption of the 
new EFF-supported IMF programme. 
4.  Implementation of macro- financial assistance 
The Community loan ofECU 45  million, decided on 13 June 1994, was to be disbursed in 
two  tranches,  upon  the  fulfilment  of conditions  specified  in  the  Memorandum  of 
Understanding  (MOU)  at.tached  to  the loan  agreement.  The  first  tranche,  of ECU  25 
million, was disbursed in December 1994, on the basis of  the successful completion of  the 
first  programme review under the IMF  stand-by arrangement.  The disbursement of the 
second tranche, of  ECU 20 million, was conditional upon a successful track record of the 
IMF  stand-by  arrangement  and  subject  to  a positive evaluation by  the Commission of 
performance criteria and of  progress made with respect to structural reform in the areas of 
price,  trade and  foreign  exchange liberalisation,  privatisation,  and  financial  discipline  of 
enterprises and financial sector. 52 
In view of the  measures  taken and  the  commitments  provided  by  the  authorities,  the 
conditions attached to the disbursement of the second tranche of the Community loan 
were broadly met. The disbursement of  the second tranche therefore took place in August 
1995. 
In order to ensure a sustainable balance of payments situation in the 1995-1996 period, 
further  macro-financial  assistance in favour  of Moldova,  to complement  the resources 
provided by  the IMF  and  the World  Bank,  was recognised  as  being  necessary  by· the 
international  donor community,  in  the  framework  of the  Consultative  Group  meeting 
organised  by  the World  Bank in  March  1995.  In  this  context,  the  ECOFIN  Council 
indicated on 20 March 1995 that it would fav~urably consider a Commission proposal for 
further Community assistance.  Following the disbursement of the second tranche of the 
first macro-financial assistance,  the Commission formally  adopted in November  1995  a 
proposal for further macro-financial assistance to Moldova of  up to ECU 15 _million.  The 
Council  decided  on  25  March  199612  to  adopt  the  Commission  proposal.  The 
implementation of  this new assistance is however subordinated to the adoption by the IMF 
of  the new three-year programme to be supported by an EFF and will also be subject to 
the fulfilment of  conditions still to be negotiated with the Moldovan authorities and to be 
included in a new Memorandum of  Understanding. 
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VIII. ROMANIA 
1.  Introduction 
Romania was a relatively latecomer among Central and Eastern European ~ountries in the 
implementation of the adjustment and· reform process required for the. establishment of a 
market economy.  Despite  a number of exogenous  shocks  (collapse  of the  tra~tional 
Soviet market,  the need for  a fast  trade re-orientation,  the negative impact, of the UN 
imposed  embargo  on  Serbia  etc.),  Romania's  macroeconomic  performance  has  been 
encouraging in 1995. 
Available data point to a very high real GOP growth in 1995. The official unemployment 
rate was brought down and the high inflation rate {1993:300%) was drastically reduced. 
In 1995  the estimated budget deficit/GOP ratio was 2. 8%.  Consumer prices have been 
liberalized,  trade  has  been  re-oriented  towards  the  West  and  exports  are  expanding 
vigorously.  The  role  of private  et:lterprises  is  increasing  in  terms  of added  value, 
employment, capitalization, investment and exports. 
In 1995 the country regained access to the international capital market. At the same time, 
Romania  experienced  growing  difficulties  with implementing  tight  monetary  and  fiscal 
.  policies~ the trade balance and the current account both deteriorated, the exchange rate 
failed to stabilize and a significant divergence (up to 20%) re-appeared by the end of  last 
year between the inte~bank exchange fllte and the (relatively free) exchange bureaux rate, 
reflecting the government's  involve~ent in the forex market.  This means that Romania is 
de facto  under a dua!  exchange rate regime.  The government continues to rely  heavily 
upon administrative,  regulatory  and  restrictive  licensing  measures  particularly  vis-a-vis 
financial intermediaries and commercial banks active on the foreign exchange market. 
In  1995  foreign  currency reserves  declined  substantially,  reflecting  the  Central  Bank's 
attempt to stabilize the leu exchange rate. 
Results attained so far with structural reform appear to be mixed,  particularly as regards 
the  demonopolization  of financial  services,  financial  restructuring  and  privatization  of 
state-owned enterprises,  further  reductions  in  subsidies  and  further  trade liberalization. 
Despite some delays and "stop-and-go" policies, many decisions have finally been adopted 
during 1995 and the legislative and administrative lay-out is now available for programme 
implementation in 1996 and beyond. 
The IMF  review in  November-December  1995  led  to  the  approval  by  the Fund  of an 
extension of  the current stand-by arrangement to April 1997 and the increase of  it to US$ 
750 million,  to  be  disbursed  in  several  tranches.  At  the  same  time,  the  World  Bank 
finalized  a FESAL loan in favour of Romania worth US$  280 million.  The Community 
decided to disburse the first tranche (ECU 55 million) of  its macroeconomic loan, totalling 
ECU 125 million in November 1995. 
2.  Macroeconomic developments 
The  main  objective  of the  government's macroeconomic  programme  for  1995  was to 
bring annual inflation down from 62% as of  end of 1994 to around 30%, reduce the fiscal 
deficit,  support production and  exports, liberalize the foreign exchange market,  stabilize 
the  leu  exchange  rate,  and  improve  the  country's  external  position.  To  attain  these 54 
ambitious objectives, the government committed itself to continue implementing a rather 
restrictive monetary, fiscal and incomes policy and, at the same time, accelerate structural 
reforms and develop market-based regulatory insttuments in the financial market. 
To strengthen the overall position of the country's balance of payments and  stabilize the 
leu,  adequate external financing was required, under the form of IMF  and WB financial 
support,  FDI  investment  and  borrowing  on  the  international  capital  market.  In  this 
respect, efforts were made with a view to increasing· the Western and IFis' confidence on 
the  Romanian  policy  programme  and  in  the  country's  economic  perspectives  on  the 
medium-term. 
Moreover, while  Romania's economic performance continued to be positive in  1995  in 
several respects, only a sluggish progress was recorded in carrying out structural reforms. 
The  overall  situation  became  more  problematic  by  the  end  of the  year  with  the  re-
appearance of a major spread between the official and the market-determined exchange 
rates~  foreign  currency  reserves  further  contracted,  the  country's  external  position 
weakened considerably and the confidence on leu declined sharply. 
GDP  real  growth in  1995  reached  6.9%  (against  1.3%  and  3.9%  in  1993  and  1994 
respectively).  Industrial  production  increased  by  8.9%,  agriculture  by  4.9%  and 
construction by  11.9%. Hourly labour productivity increased by  15% in  1995, compared 
to the same period of  the preceding year. The unemployment rate contracted from 11% at 
the beginning of 1995 to 9.3% at the end ofDecember. This was caused in large part by a 
reallocation  of employment  towards  the  agricultural  sector,  which  appears  to  have 
absorbed a substantial portion of  the labour force released from industry. This trend could 
hardly be seen as sustainable, given the low level of  productivity of  the agricultural sector, 
which already employs above 30% of the total labour force.  Inflation has been reduced 
substantially from an annual rate of 62% in  1994 to 33.3% in  1995. However, consumer 
prices increases sharply accelerated during the last quarter of  the year, partly in the light of 
seasonal  factors  and  partly  reflecting  the  fact  that  non-inflationary  economic  growth 
cannot be sustained without major structural adjustment. 
In 1995, the budget defidt ratio was contained to 2.~% ofGDP, reflecting administrative 
decisions  aimed  at cutting  direct  current  public  expenditure,  limiting  public  financial 
transfers  to  loss-making  enterprises  and  raising  fiscal  revenue,  following  the 
implementation of a tax reform in  1994.  A. considerable  quasi-fiscal  deficit  still  exists· 
under the form of  preferential lending by the Central Bank and state owned banks to loss 
making SOEs. Some autonomous extra-budgetary funds have also been established. 
In 1995, Romania's external position deteriorated. The trade deficit was around US$  1.3 
bn,  more than twice the deficit recorded in  1994  (US$ 582 million).  The deficit rose in 
spite of  a rather promising expansion of  exports, which increased by about 22% compared 
to  1994.  Moreover,  the  increase  in  imports  was  much  higher,  slightly  above  32%, 
reflecting a surge in the demand for Western manufactured and  capital goods as well as 
energy,  mainly  by  loss-making  public  enterprises.  In  line  with  the  weakening  current 
account position (which recorded a deficit of 4.4% of GDP) in  1995,  foreign .exchange 
reserves declined, to reach US$ 2. 7 bn by the year-end equivalent to less than two months 
of imports,  down  from  a level  corresponding to  about  four  months  of imports  at  the 
beginning of  the year. 55 
FDI through joint ventures  started to  pick up  in the third  quarter of 1995.  However, 
foreign investment performance in 1995 was disappointing with new flows in the region of 
US$ 400 million against 500 million witnessed in  1994. In 1995, Romania also managed 
to regain access to the international financial market through a series of syndicated loans 
which were over-subscribed. 
Romania's external debt remains relatively low. At the end of 1995 the medium and long 
term external debt increased moderately to US$  5.3  billion,  from US$ 4.5  billion at the 
end of  the previous year. 
Monetary and fiscal policy has followed a rather uneven path in 1995. Restrictive policies, 
responsible for most of the positive results particularly as regards the decline of inflation 
rate and the leu's relative stability during the first half of  the year were somewhat loosened 
in the  course of 1995.  However,  in  view  of negotiations on the  extension of the IMF 
stand-by arrangement, the authorities again tightened monetary policy during the last two 
months of 1995 mainly through a sharp increase in the refinancing rate and introduced a 
restrained  draft budget for  1996.  The National  Bank of Romania  (NBR)  still  provides 
preferential  credit  ("directed  credit")  in  favour  of the  agricultural  sector,  export  and 
energy at an interest rate of35%. 
The  implementation  of credit  control  measures  by  the  monetary  authorities  reduced 
commercial banks' access to the Central Bank refinancing, thus weakening their" financial 
position.  The  subsequent  credit  squeeze  led  to  a  considerable  expansion  of payment 
arrears at enterprise.level. 
The continuing  administrative  intervention on the foreign  exchange market  throughout 
1995  and  the  temporary  measures  taken  by  the monetary  authorities  in  March  1996, 
limiting the number of  banks licensed to operate on the forex market, have been causes of 
serious concern. At present, a dual exchange rate fixing mechanism is "de facto" in place, 
and the volume of  daily foreign exchange transactions on the inter-bank market contracted 
sharply during the first quarter of 1996. 
3.  Structural reforms 
./ 
Eliminating  arrears  and  1mposmg  financial  discipline  on  loss-making  state-owned 
enterprises  constituted  key  objectives  in  Romania's  economic  stabilization  and 
restructuring  programme  for  1995.  A  number  of large  state-owned  companies  and 
"Regies autonomes"  have been targeted for  strict financial  surveillance.  These measures 
include  isolation from  the  banking  system,  negotiation of conciliation  agreements  with 
their creditors  as  well  as  elaboration and  implementation of Financial  Recovery  Plans. 
Also  it  was  envisaged  to  accelerate  the  standard  and  mass  privatization  programmes. 
Results  attained  so  far  are  preliminary  and  difficult  to  assess  because  of a  number  of 
delays  in  programme  implementation,  growing  financial  problems,  and  administrative 
inefficiency.  The overall picture,  however,  is  rather disappointing.  Parliament approved 
the long-overdue Commercial Insolvency Law in  March  1995.  The law  permits out-of-
court conciliation procedures and,  if required,  the initiation of bankruptcy  proceedings, 
while allowing sufficient flexibility for rescue operations. 
The large state enterprises which  still  dominate  the economy  continue  to benefit  from 
partially hidden quasi-subsidies such as below-market interest rates and directed credits. If 
properly accounted for,  these would increase· the public  deficit,  thus clearly making  the 56 
fiscal policy stance less restrictive.  Furthermore,  state companies unable to service their 
debts are rarely  forced  into liquidation,  which adds  to  the inefficiency  of the financial 
sector. 
The number of privatized enterprises has increased, but by the end of the year only one 
third of  small enterprises, and merely 6% of  large ones, had been privatized. The response 
of the public to the mass privatization programme launched in mid-1995  has been worse 
than expected,  thus  obliging  the  authorities  to postpone  the  deadline  for  registration. 
Citizens may  now invest their vouchers directly into companies until the end of March 
1996, or in the Private Ownership Fund until the end of  April. 
The proc~ure  for privatising two of  the five major state-owned banks was due to start in 
1995 but was postponed until  1996  and  only  one bank has  so  far  been nominated,  the 
Romanian Development Bank. 
4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
Following Romania's agreement in principle with the IMF on a new programme for 1994-
95,  the  authorities  requested  the  EU  and  the  G24  to  grant  further  macro-fmancial 
assistance to Romania to cover the residual external financing  gap  of US$  275  million 
under the  1994-95  programme.  Commitments by  the EU/G-24 reached  some US$  219 
million  or nearly  80%  of the  residual  gap.  This  includes  further  EU  macro-financial 
assistance for an amount up to ECU 125 million, in two tranches, decided by the Council 
on  20  June  199413.1n  December  1994,  the  Commission  agreed  with  the  Romanian 
authorities  the  macro-economic  conditions  attached  to  the  disbursement  of the  loan. 
However,  the disbursement of the first  tranche (ECU  55  million)  was delayed,  due  to 
policy slippages that occurred during the implementation of the programme in  the first 
quarter of 1995. 
In early July the Romanian authorities reached an understanding with the IMF that paved 
the way for completion of  the first review of  the programme, which eventually took place 
in November/December 199 5.  The disbursement of the first tranche of the EU loan took 
place in November 1995. 
The  disbursement  of the  second  tranche  (70  MECU)  is  linked  to  the  effective 
implementation of  specific structural reform measures, including progress in privatization, 
financial restructuring of  loss-making enterprises and banking sector reforms, agreed upon 
with the Romanian authorities in the Memorandum of  Understanding. 
13  Council Decision 94/369/EC 57 
IX. THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
1.  Introduction 
The dissolution of  the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) on 1 J~uary 1993 had 
several negative implicatiorts for the Slovak economy at a time when it was still suffering 
from  the  shock  associated  with  the  dismantling  of the  Council  of Mutual  Economic 
Assistance and from the difficulties  accompanying  the transition to a market economy. 
The dissolution of the federation implied the loss of substantial fiscal  transfers from the 
Czech-lands, disrupted trade with the Czech Republic, restricted Slovakia's access to the 
international  capital markets,  and  was accompanied  by  speculation  against  the  Slovak 
crown that practically depleted its official foreign exchange reserves. 
In  this  context,  the  Slovak  government  agreed  with  the  IMF  in  mid-1993  on  a 
macroeconomic stabilization programme for the rest of  that year, which was supported by 
the· approval in July 1993 of  a first purchase in the amount of SDR 64.4 million un9er the 
IMF's  Systemic  Transformation  Facility  (STF).  In  addition,  the  World  Bank  granted 
Slovakia a US$ 80 million Economic Recovery Loan (ERL) in November 1993. 
In July 1994, the IMF approved a 20-month stand-by credit and a second purchase under 
the  STF  totalling  SDR  180  million,  in  support  of a  more  comprehensive  economic 
programme for  1994-95.  In parallel,  the World  Bank began  discussions  on a  possible 
Enterprise  and  Financial  Sector  Adjustment  Loan  (EFSAL).  In  support  of  this 
programme, the EU Council adopted on 22 December 199414 a decision making available 
macro-financial assistance to Slovakia amounting up to ECU 130 million,  as part of a G-
24  initiative  to  respond  to  the  request  by  the  Slovak  authorities  for  complementary 
assistance.  Other. members  of the  G-24  made  further  commitments  amounting  to  US$ 
87.3 million. 
2.  Macroeconomic developments 
The  improvement  in  macroeconomic  performance  that  started  in  1994  continued  and 
intensified in 1995. The recovery of  economic activity accelerated, with real GOP growing 
by an impressive 7.4% and industrial production by an ~stimated 8.4%. Domestic demand 
replaced net exports as the driving force behind economic expansion. The strengthening of 
domestic demand,  however,  largely reflected the behaviour of private consumption and 
stock  building.  Fixed  investment,  which  had  been  declining  sharply  ever  since  the 
transition process began, recorded practically no growth in  199  5.  The economic upswing 
has also been reflected in a decline in the unemployment rate from 15.2% in January 1995 
to 13.7% in February 1996. 
Despite  this  strong growth  performance,  inflation  has  continued  to  show a downward 
trend.  Inflation,  as  measured  by  the year-on-year  consumer  price ·index  (CPI)  declined 
from  11.7%  in  December  1994  to  only  6.1%  in  March  1996,  the lowest inflation  rate 
recorded by any transition country. Real wage growth remained high in  1995 (real wages 
in the industrial sector increased by about 6%) but is,  to a significant extent, being offset 
by strong productivity gains. 
14  Council Decision 94/939/EC. 58 
The reduction in inflation has continued to be  supported by  restrictive macroeconomic 
policies. Reflecting larger than anticipated revenues from VAT and income tax, the state 
budget finished  1995 with a deficit of Sk 8.3  billion, well below the Sk 21  billion deficit 
that  had  been  programmed.  At  the  same  time,  the  general  government  surplus  was 
estimated at about 0.5% of GDP, which compares to a deficit. of 1.4% of GDP in  1994 
and of7.6% ofGDP in 1993. Monetary policy has also remained relatively tight, although 
its stance has been somewhat eased compared to 1994.  The net domestic assets of the 
banking  system expanded  by  5% in  1995,  approximately  as  programmed.  The money 
supply (M2), however, grew faster than programmed, reflecting the rapid expansion of  net 
foreign assets, in tum a consequence of the stronger than expected balance of payments 
situation. M2 is estimated to have increased by 20.8%, compared to a programme target 
of 10%.  Consistent  with its  policy  of increasingly  relying  on indirect  instruments  of 
monetary control,  the National Bank of Slovakia (NBS)  abolished  all  remaining  credit 
ceilings on banks in January 1996. 
After the remarkable improvement experienced in 1994,  Slovakia's balance of payments 
continued to strengthen in 1995. The current account, which had swung from a deficit of 
5.4% of GDP in 1993 to a surplus of 5.7% of GDP in  1994, recorded a new surplus of 
4.3% of GDP in  1995.  The evolution of the trade balance in the first  months of 1996, 
however, suggests that the surplus will continue to shrink in  1996 reflecting the strength 
of  domestic demand. 
The capital account also improved in  1995, with total net capital inflows reaching almost 
US$ 1 billion, compared to US$ 130 million in  1994.  The main factor behind this rise in 
net  capital  inflows  has  been  the  substantial  increase  in  foreign  borrowing  by  Slovak 
enterprises and banks. Also,  the tight management of.interbank liquidity by the NBS, in 
combination with the perceived stability of  the Slovak crown (and, during the first half of 
1995, the expectation of a revaluation against the Czech crown), has led to some short-
term capital  inflows.  Foreign direct  investment  inflows,  however,  have  remained  low, 
partly  reflecting  uncertainty  over  the  government's  market-oriented  reforms  and,  in 
particular, over privatization (see below). 
Slovakia's  access to the international capital markets has  been facilitated  by  successive 
upgradings of Slovakia's credit ratings.  In May  1995, Moody's assigned  to Slovakia an 
investment grade rating (Baa3). Standard & Poor's, for its part, upgraded Slovakia's rating 
in April 1995 (from BB- to as+) and again in April  1996 (to BBB-, an investment grade 
mark).  Slovakia  has  thus  become  one  of the  few  transition  countries  that  can  boast 
investment grade ratings from the leading US rating agencies. 
These favourable trends in both the current and capital accounts have been translated into 
a substantial increase in international reserves. Official reserves (including gold) rose from 
US$ 1.75 billion at the end of 1994 to US$ 3.4 billion at the end of 1995. This represents 
a comfortable level of  about 4 months of  imports. During the same period, the reserves of 
whole banking system have increased from US$ 3. 1 billion to US$ ·s billion. 
Following a 10% devaluation of the Slovak crown in July  1993~ the exchange rate of the 
crown has  been kept stable  against  a basket of Western currencies.  In July  1994,  the 
number of  currencies in the basket was reduced from five to two (the Deutsche mark and 
the US dollar).  In view of  the termination of the bilateral clearing system with the Czech 59 
Republic  in  October  1995,  the  Slovak  ci"o~ was  revalued  by  5%  against  the  Czech 
currency.  In January  1996,  the fluctuation  band  around  the  central  rate was increased 
from+- 1.5% to+- 3%. 
Slovakia  inherited  from  the  Czechoslovak  federation  a  relatively  low .  external  debt. 
Although  debt  and  debt  service  ratios  have  deteriorated  since  the  country  reached 
independence,  they  remain  at  reasonable  levels.  The  foreign  debt-over-GDP  ratio  has 
increased.from 25.7% in early  1993  to 33.8% in October 1995. The debt service-over-
exports ratio, for its part, has risen from 3.3% in 1992 to an estimated 9.5% in 1995. 
3.  Structural reforms 
In Spring 1994, the Slovak authorities adopted a plan to accelerate privatization based on 
a greater reliance on voucher privatization. By November 1994, about 3.5 million citizens 
had registered to buy vouchers. The new Slovak government formed  in December 1994, 
however,  decided  in June  1995  to cancel  the voucher privatization scheme.  Instead of 
shares in  state enterprises, the Slovak citizens that bought vouchers have been given 5-
year interest  bearing  bonds  issued  by  the  National  Property Fund  (NPF).  NPF  bonds 
totalling Sk 33.3 billion (or the equivalent of about 8% of GOP) were issued in January 
1996. This new scheme not only implies a new delay in the privatization process but could 
· have negative fiscal implications, particularly given the fact that the total market value of 
the shares that were earmarked for voucher privatization is likely to be significantly below 
the total face value of  the bonds issued by the NPF. 
The decision to cancel the voucher scheme is part of a more general shift in privatization 
policy announced  by  the current government.  The new privatization policy emphasizes 
standard methods of  privatization. Direct sales (largely sales to managers and employees) 
have gathered momentum since mid-1995, but (they) are being criticized for their lack of 
transparency.  Another  important  element  of  the  new  privatization  policy  is  the 
government's  decision,  incorporated  in  Law  No.  175  passed  in  July  1995,  to  keep 
permanent  state  ownership  in  29  so-called  "important  enterprises"  (including  the  big 
utilities  in  the energy sector,  telecommunications  and  armament  enterprises).  Since  the 
bulk  of the  "important  enterprises"  had  initially  been  included  in  the  1994  voucher 
privatization scheme, this measure has effectively reduced by  about 35% the total book 
value  of the  enterprises  slated  for  privatization  under  the  second  wave  of large-scale 
privatization. Law No.  175  also allows the state veto power over key decisions in 45 so-
called  "strategic enterprises"  (including the largest industrial  enterprises)  and  shifts  the 
exercise of the state ownership rights over "strategic enterprises"  back from the NPF to 
the founding ministries. These decisions regarding "strategic enterprises" could slow both 
the privatization and the restructuring of  these enterprises. However, the part of  Law No. 
175  allowing the state to maintain (or regain)  "golden shares"  in  "strategic enterprises" 
has been declared unconstitutional by the Slovak constitutional court. 
Regarding the Slovak financial  system,  substantial progress still  needs to be made with 
respect  to  the  problem  of non-performing  loans,  privatization  and  the  promotion  of 
competition. Stricter regulations on the classification and provisioning of bad loans came 
into  force  in  July  1995.  Government  concern  about  the  negative  fiscal  repercussions, 
however, has so far prevented the passing of  tax law amendments temporarily granting to 
banks  full  taX  deductibility  for  bad-loan provisions,  a measure  that the authorities had 
originally  envisaged  to  take  place  by  end-1994.  In  Januaiy  1996,  the  government 
announced its intention to sell in 1996 its majority holdings in the country's largest savings 60 
bank (Sloveilska Sporitelna), the two largest commercial banks (VUB and IRB) and the 
largest  insurance  company  (Slovenska  Poistovna).  In  February  1996,  the  Parliament 
passed a new banking law strengthening the supervisory powers of  the NBS. 
Following abuses and irregularities by  certain privatization investment funds  (PIFs) and 
investment companies,  the Ministry of Finance,  in the first  half of 1995,  restricted the 
operations of  several of  them. In addition, new legislation was adopted in July 1995 aimed 
at increasing the transparency and control of their activities,  and at better protecting the 
shareholders of the PIFs.  Unfortunately,  however,  the  new  regulations,  in conjunction 
with the cancellation of  the voucher privatization scheme, will also limit the role ofPIFs in 
corporate governance.  In particular,  with effect from the end of 1996,  the limit on the 
maximum equity stake an PIF may hold in a given company will be reduced from 20% to 
10% of  the company•s capital. 
Under pressure from the EU and WTO, the Slovak authorities reduced the l 0% import 
surcharge on consumer goods which was introduced in March 1994, to 7.5% from mid-
July  1996.  Following  deliberations  in  the WTO  Balance  of Payments  Committee,  the 
Slovak authorities have announced that they would abolish the surcharge by the end of 
1996. 
On ·1  October 1995, a new foreign exchange act came into effect. The Slovak crown was 
made  fully  convertible for  current  account  purposes,  and  the bilateral  clearing  system 
maintained with the Czech Republic. since early 1993 was terminated. The authorities also 
intend gradually to relax certain restrictions on capital movements. 
Most prices in Slovakia have been liberalized. The share of  items that still have regulated 
prices represents only about 5% of total turnover. These items include energy (electricity, 
gas,  heating  and  petrol),  water,  pharmaceutical  products,  rents,  telephones  and  public 
transportation. Electricity, gas and heating tariffs paid by households remain significantly 
below  their  economic  cost-recovery  levels.  The  upward  adjustment  of these  tariffs 
envisaged under the World Bank ERL's and  the  Il\.1F•s  stand-by  programmes  have  not 
been implemented. 
4.  Implementation of niacro-financial assistance 
Slovakia· met all the macroeconomic targets and performance criteria agreed with the IMF 
in the context of  the 1994-95 stand-by programme. However, the failure to implement the 
structural reform conditions prevented a successful completion of the mid-term review of 
the  programme,  which  had  initially  been  scheduled  for  March  1995.  The main  factor 
preventing the approval of  the mid-term review were the delays and the subsequent policy 
shifts in the area of privatization, including the unexpected cancellation of the shares-for-
vouchers scheme and its replacement by the scheme based on the issuance of  NPF bonds. 
The  authorities  also  failed  to  comply  with  the  conditions  regarding  the  granting  of 
temporary full tax deductibility for bad loan provisions made by banks, the adjustment of 
energy  prices  and  the  elimination  of the  import  surcharge.  The  slow  formulation  and 
instability  of privatization  and  other  structural  policies  also  led  the  World  Bank  to 
discontinue discussions on an EFSAL operation in April 1995 .. 
In May 1995, the Commission services held discussions with the Slovak authorities on the 
economic policy measures to be attached to the implementation of the EU loan facility. 
During  the  discussions,  however,  insufficient  progress  was  made,  with  the  Slovak 
authorities  showing  little  flexibility  with  respect  to  the  measures  emphasized  by  the 61 
Commission,  in  particular  the  early  phasing  .out  of the  1  0%  import  surcharge,  the 
adjustment of energy prices and the need to prevent the new regulations on PIFs from 
weakening their role in  corporate governance.  The resumption  of the discussions  was 
complicated  by  the  government's  decisions  on privatization  announced  in  June  1995, 
including in particular the cancellation of the shares-for-vouchers privatization scheme, 
which was considered by  the Commission to be an essential condition for the effective 
disbursement of  the assistance. 
Meanwhile, and as noted above,  Slovakia's macroeconomic and, in particular, balance of 
payments situation experienced a remarkable turnaround. In view of the strengthening of 
the external position, the Slovak government announced that they did not wish to draw on 
the remaining tranches of the IMF stand-by credit. In the event,  Slovakia only made the 
first two purchases (totalling SDR 32.2 million) under this stand-by arrangement, which 
expired in March 1996. 
In this context, on 23  January 1996, the Commission approved a proposal for a Council 
decision  repealing  the  1994  decision  granting  further  macro-financial  assistance  to 
Slovakia. This decision is expected to be adopted by the Council in 1996. 
Regarding the implementation of  the complementary macro-financial assistance committed 
by other G-24 members, Japan released its US$ 60 million assistance in early May 1995, 
in the form of an Exim Bank co-financing of  the World Bank's ERL. No disbursements by 
other donprs had taken place at the timt:: of  writing of  this report. 62 
X.  UKRAINE 
1.  Introduction 
The  on-going  struggle  between  reformers  and  conservative  forces . continues  to 
characterize economic policy and slows down progr~ss in economic reform in Ukraine. In 
the second half of 1995 several slippages in policy implementation led to a weakening of 
the exchange rate and to the budget and inflation targets being missed. Therefore, the IMF 
suspended the execution of  its Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) in December (and eventually 
let it expire in early 1996). Nevertheless, progress in stabilisation has been considerable in 
1995:  the speed of decline in the economy was halved from -23.% in  1994 to -11,8%, 
inflation and  the general government deficit were brought down,  and the trade balance 
improved.  Structural reforms were started in the end of 1994 and  have achieved  some 
results,  mainly  in  price  and  trade  liberalisation  and  more  recently  in  small-scale 
privatization.  However, progress on large-scale privatization and  restructuring has been 
slow and foreign direct investment is  still negligible.  As a consequence of erratic policy 
implementation  and  slow  structural reform  as  well  as  severe weather  conditions,  it  is 
expected that economic growth will only recover in 1997. 
1.  Macroeconomic performance 
It took three years after the independence of the country before economic reforms were 
finally  started  in  Ukraine  in  October  1994.  After ·his  election,  President  Kuchma 
introduced  a  programme  of price,  trade  and  exchange  liberalisation,  combined  with 
reductions  in  subsidies  and  state  intervention.  A  tighter  fiscal  policy  was  adopted, 
buttressed by a restrictive monetary policy.  The programme was able to slow down the 
rapid economic deterioration. By mid-1995, monthly inflation was reduced to around 5%, 
the  exchange  rate  of  the  karbovanets  (Ukraine's  temporary  currency)  stabilised, 
international reserves  accumulated and  a stabilisation of output seemed  possible  in the 
short-term. 
However,  President Kuchml,l  and  Prime Minister Marchuk continued  to be  confronted 
with a conservative  majorit~ in  Parli~ent that managed to· delay or even cancel  some 
reform  measures.  Furthermore,  during  the  summer  of 1995,  doubts  arose  over  the 
commitment of the government to continue the transformation process.  The government 
encouraged  the  commercial  banks  to  increase  their  credits  to  insolvent  enterprises, 
enterprise subsidies were increased and the budget continued to pay for accumulated gas 
debts of the  enterprise  sector.  Monetary financing  of the  deficit  was also  higher  than 
expected. Consequently, the karbovanets weakened again and the end-of-year budget and 
inflation  targets  were  missed.  Because  structural  reform  was  also  lagging,  the  IMF 
decided  in  December  1995  to postpone a  decision  on the disbursement  of the fourth 
tranche of  the SBA. 
Although Ukraine was not able to observe the objectives of its stabilisation programme in 
winter  1995/96,  progress in  stabilisation has  been  considerable in  1995.  The speed  of 
decline in the economy was halved from -23% in  1994 to -11,8% in 1995 with even some 
month-on-month improvements before August. It is now expected that GDP will continue 
to fall  in  1996 before stabilising in  1997  at an output level of around 40% of the pre-
transition level.  However,  because  of the  growing  importance  of the  informal  sector, 
official  figures  might  underestimate  the  actual  progress  in  economic  activity.  Yearly 
inflation  was  brought  down  from  401%  in  December  1994  to  182%  one year  later. 63 
Further improvement is expected for 1996. Although different data sources differ widely 
on sign  and  level  of the  trade balance,  they  all  show an  improvement  in  1995,  as  a 
consequence of  growing exports, mainly to non-FSU countries and, stagnating imports  . 
.. 
Registered unemployment in Ukraine remains extremely low at about one .half percent of 
the  labour  force.  Actual  unemployment,  however,  may  be  considerably  higher  since 
· hidden  unemployment  in  large  state firms  and  administration  remains  high  and  many 
enterprises in difficulty maintain their personnel but send them on unpaid leave.  Wages 
generally increased quite rapidly in 1995.  Real wages increased by  12% and the average 
wage increase in the government sector in the first half of 1995  was about 50% in real 
terms,  bringing  wages  to the  same  levels  as  in  the  enterprise  sector,  thereby  adding 
pressure on the budget and on inflation. 
The government budget for 1995 aimed at reducing the cash deficit from 8.6% of-GDP in 
1994 to 3%. The actual outcome is more likely to have been around 4%, mairily due to an 
overrun in public expenditures. The overrun is even more important when it is taken into 
account that the government again accumulated some payment arrears on energy imports 
which are not visible in the deficit figure on a cash basis. 
3.  Structural reforms 
Before 1994, Ukraine made little or no progress with structural reform. After his election, 
President Kuchma issued a decree, in November 1994, to initiate a votlcher-based mass 
privatization programme and  set a target of 8,000 (out of 18,000) medium  and  large 
enterprises to be privatised in 199 5.  However, due to organisational problems, opposition 
from the Parliament and local bureaucracies, too high reservation prices, the exclusion of 
foreign investors as well as  a lack of confidence on the part of the general public,  only 
2, 700 epterprises were actually put up for sale and the majority of  shares in only 1,500 of 
these  enterprises  have  effectively  been  sold.  This  lack  of progress  is  particularly 
preoccupying in the important agricultural sector.  Continued  disagreement  between the 
President and Parliament on the way to proceed has  prevented any significant progress. 
Until recently, progress with regard to small-scale privatization has also remained limited. 
The beneficial effects of  new measures that were introduced in late 1994 only appeared iri 
the thi~d quarter of 1995. Consequently, an important number of  small businesses was still 
to be privatised in 1996, although it was originally intended to end this operation by the 
end of1995. 
Given the limited progress on privatization and the absence of  foreign direct investment, 
enterprise  restructuring  continues  to  be  weak.  The  old  monopolistic  structure  of the 
economy  is  still  widely  present,  mainly  in  heavy  industries  and  in  the  chemical  and 
pharmaceutical sectors. Because directed bank credits and important subsidy flows persist, 
the  budget  constraint  for  most  enterprises  remains  soft.  Furthermore,  inter-enterprise 
arrears  are  accumulating  rapidly  and  although  a  bankruptcy  legislation  exists,  its 
implementation is ineffective. 
4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
The EU loan of ECU 85  million decided on 22 December 1994 (94/940/EC) was to be 
disbursed  in  a  single  tranche  conditional  upon an IMF  stand-by  arrangement,  a  rapid 
implementation of  the EU/G-7 Nuclear Safety Action Plan for Ukraine and progress with 
structural reform.  After significant delays oh the part of Ukraine, it was finally disbursed 
in December 1995. 64 
· In view of Ukraine's urgent financial needs and against the background of further efforts 
being made by  the Ukrainian authorities  to  pursue with  economic reform,  the Council 
decided  on  23  October  199515  to  provide  Ukraine  with  further  Community  macro-
financial  assistance in the form of a second loan of up to ECU 200 million. that would 
complement  financial  assistance  from  the  international  financial  institutions  and  other 
bilateral donors. 
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